Small Wars Journal

Traditional and Non-Western Actors in the Foreign Policy of the EU

Fri, 12/13/2013 - 9:45am

Traditional and Non-Western Actors in the Foreign Policy of the EU

Case: Qawms in Afghanistan

Wouter van Acker

The effectiveness and efficiency of foreign policies depends on a great number of factors, and not in the slightest on the initial design of those policies. When a western country or organization chooses to focus its policy towards Afghanistan solely on western-style actors and networks, things are bound to go wrong. If, like in Afghanistan, the central government is weak, other actors, actors that policy makers might not have even heard of, are often more influential. In those instances the foreign policies of western actors like the EU need to be designed case-by-case, with special attention to the specific local characteristics of the society it tries to help and influence.

This case-by-case design should lead to the incorporation of non-western and traditional actors into the foreign policies of western actors, and so lead to a more efficient way of doing things. Research on the topic of the incorporation of non-western actors in foreign policies remains scarce. In the search to efficiency, it is however a very relevant question. A question this paper tries to answer.

This paper will focus on the foreign policy of the EU towards Afghanistan over the period 2005-2011. There are three reasons for picking these two actors. First of all, Afghanistan is a country with an incredible amount of non-western style actors. Secondly, the EU is currently not involved in any foreign policy towards Afghanistan except for development aid. This policy field is easier to research than common foreign policies. Diplomats and politicians tend to leave a much scarcer trail of accountability than development aid officials. The analysis of traditional actors’ roles in a development policy is therefore much easier. Thirdly, development aid and traditional actors are a well fit in Afghanistan since the two seem to be especially intertwined here. This will be further clarified in the next section of the paper, where we will look deeper into the social actors and networks that are particularly relevant in the Afghan society. We will find that one actor in particular is greatly overlooked by the mainstream media, and most of the research done on Afghanistan. After that we will take a look at the development policy of the EU in Afghanistan over the period of 2005 up and till 2011. Since the EU’s scope of development projects is very broad, this papers focus is narrowed down to two areas: water irrigation and judicial reform. Two areas in which traditional actors in Afghanistan play a big role. Finally, and most importantly, we will look at the role the EU provides for non-western, Afghan actors in its foreign and development policies.

Afghan Society and its Actors

Most research focuses on ethnic or tribal actors within the Afghan society, and it cannot be denied that these are important factors. Afghanistan has been called both “The Graveyard of Empires[i] and “The Heart of Asia[ii]. It derives this last nickname from its geographical position at the intersection of three cultures: Persian, Indian and Eastern. This location caused a constant influx of different peoples, cultures and religions towards the region we now call ‘Afghanistan’. This was combined with numerous Mongolian, Persian, Ottoman and Indian army invasions, all leaving their mark on the country and its people[iii]. The huge diversity of its inhabitants as a result, is also the main cause for Afghanistan’s first nickname “The Graveyard of Empires”. The British, the Soviet-Union and perhaps also the USA/NATO; none have been able to control the Afghans. The will of the Afghan people to be autonomous seems to beat any attempt of a central or foreign power to keep the extremely diverse population under control. Politics in Afghanistan is always local, maybe more than anywhere else in the world.

Political legitimacy can be found on a central level, in Kabul for example, but only to a very limited extend. True legitimacy lies at the local level. This is the level where ethnicity and tribes come into the picture. These are actors that Afghans strongly identify themselves with, and that carry great legitimacy amongst them. However, science and politics have exaggerated the roles these two actors play in the everyday life of the Afghan people. This becomes especially relevant within the context of development cooperation, and the inclusion of local, non-western actors therein.

Firstly: Ethnicity. Besides the fact that there are huge differences between studies identifying the amount of people belonging to certain ethnicities[iv] and that we, apparently, know very little about them, ethnicity has only been a very recent factor in Afghans’ lives. It is not true that Afghanistan has always been a country with striving ethnicities. Only after the Afghans had forced the Soviet-Union out of their country, the ethnic label someone carried became important, and became the source, for the first time in history, of civil war[v]. Yes, there have been numerous ethnicities living within Afghanistan’s borders, but they previously always got along. Only over the past 25 years did it become a relevant factor in politics. The increased relevancy of ethnicity, and ethnic groups as actors, has not led to the organization of them. They don’t have a structure, leader or spokesperson. Let alone that they are concerned with the organization of society along ethnic lines. Although inter-ethnic marriages and communication are not common, all enjoy the same government facilities in healthcare, education, justice and infrastructure. So for development aid organizations to focus on ethnic groups is completely irrelevant. Obviously they should be aware of tensions that exist between the different ethnic groups, but giving for example the Hazara or Tajiks separate funds to build a road is a waste of money, simply because they are not in the business of doing that. They are cultural identities, with cultural, but no functional importance.

Secondly: Tribes. The stereotypical image of Afghanistan is one of tribesmen controlling the politics of a government trying to be modern, centralized and western. Tribes however are only relevant to one people: the Pashtun, who live in the east and south of Afghanistan[vi]. Although this is the largest ethnic group of Afghanistan, it doesn’t diminish the fact that the rest and majority of the Afghans simply do not organize themselves in tribes. Considering the trend for donor countries and organizations to work more and more focused on smaller geographical areas, it is highly advised to look at who you’re dealing with (Pashtun or other groups), and what kind of consequence this has for the actors you are able to approach with the aid you wish to provide. Working in the central lands of the Hazara, or with the Northern Tajiks makes it impossible for funding to go to tribes, since there are none or only symbolic ones. Only in the south and east, where most of the Pashtun live, tribes are organizations that can be attributed with development activities.

Besides these two well known but ill-perceived actors, one actor has been greatly overlooked: the so-called ‘Qawm’. Barfield describes these Qawms as ‘solidarity groups’[vii]. These actors play a much larger role in the Afghans’ lives, and it is with these organizations that Afghans primarily identify themselves. What a Qawm is, differs per situation. When one ethnic group would be at war with another ethnic group, a person’s ethnicity would be his or her Qawm. When there is a conflict over irrigation networks, a village will be the Qawm. So depending on the condition, someone’s Qawm can be his or her ethnicity, village, province, family, religion, etc. In general though, someone’s Qawm is most strongly related to the village, or small group of villages in which one is living. The Qawm based on genealogy, or the earlier mentioned tribe, is of much less importance, except concerning the Pashtun. This is in contrast to what most mainstream research reports and claim[viii]. Qawms are also much more involved with development-related activities such as infrastructure, irrigation, housing and the justice sector, than for example tribes or ethnic groups are[ix]. Especially the Qawms related to someone’s village, or a group of villages will be heavily involved in these kinds of policy areas. They are therefor much more relevant for development organizations and actors involved in development cooperation policies.

So foreign and development policies should take into account what kind of Qawm one has to deal with. The main question in this paper is which Qawms the EU should take into account in its foreign policies towards Afghanistan, and to what extend it actually does. Secondly, what are the consequences of the choices the EU has made concerning the degree of involvement of Qawms in its policies? Before we try to find an answer to those questions, we shall first look at the foreign policy of the EU towards Afghanistan in general, and what would be the appropriate kind of Qawm that should be incorporated in it.

The EU in Afghanistan

The EU’s policies towards Afghanistan have intensified greatly after the international military intervention of 2001. Besides an ‘Everything but Arms’ trade-agreement the EU’s foreign policy exists only of development aid, with which it is one of the biggest donors in the country. Because it only exists of development aid, the European Commission is the sole implementer of the EU’s foreign policy, and more specifically the Directorate General Development and Cooperation (DG DevCo). The goals, principles and focus areas of the aid are laid out in a mutually drafted and signed agreement between the EU and the Afghan Government[x]. This ‘Joint Declaration’ sets out the areas of the development the EU will focus on, which are again operationalized in more detail in the Country Strategy Paper, written by the Commission in 2007[xi]. In this strategy paper the Commission identifies 3 focal areas, and 3 non-focal areas of its development aid:

In the same document, the EU focuses the scope of its development aid to just the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country, instead of being active in 33 out of the 35 provinces in Afghanistan. This is an important detail because, as we have seen, the type of actor that would have to be involved in the development policies differs per region. As we can see on the following map, Tajiks and Uzbeki’s and Nuristani’s inhabit most of the east and northeast of Afghanistan[xii]. This means that tribes are largely unimportant actors in these regions, and are therefore unimportant actors in the EUs development policies as well.

If tribes, or genealogically based Qawms, are not important, than which ones are? As said earlier, this depends largely on the focus of the development aid. We have already seen that the EU is mainly focused on healthcare, rural development and governance. Within these three focal areas we specify two who have gotten a lot of attention and emphasize from the EU: the development of the judicial sector and the development of water irrigation systems. These are typical examples of areas in which Qawms (defined as a village, or a group of villages) are very involved. The question then is: does the EU take these particular non-western actors into account when it delivers its development aid in Afghanistan? To investigate the role of the relevant Qawms in the EU’s policies, I will carried out a discourse analysis over more than twenty key-documents of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Afghan Government itself[xiii]. The latter can tell us a lot about the role of Qawms in the EU’s policies as well. As a signing party of the Paris Declaration, the EU focuses a lot of its funds towards Afghan policies and Afghan initiatives, instead of carrying out development by itself. First we will look at the reforms in the justice sector, before turning to water irrigation works.

Justice Sector Reform

Judicial reform in a country such as Afghanistan can be a tricky endeavor. First of all there is the question of legitimacy. The local forms of justice through religious leaders or town elderly can be, and often are, perceived by the Afghan population as more legitimate than those provide for by the state. This is further enhanced by the amount of corruption and ineffectiveness of the official system. The central government can therefor be tempted to look at the local, informal judicial institutions to relax the already overloaded official judicial system, and look for the so desperately craved sense of legitimacy among its people. This might, however, not be a very wise step. Firstly: control over the informal institutions is next to impossible. Secondly: there will be little or no respect for human rights, and those of women and children in particular. It seems logical therefor that the EU, a strong human rights advocate, will not adopt Qawms within its efforts to modernize the Afghan judicial system. The discourse analysis however, leads to a different conclusion.

The topic of an informal justice sector or the actors therein is not mentioned with depth in any of the EU’s and EC’s documents. A lot of emphasize is put however on the Justice for All project, written and carried out by the Afghan Government, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDP) and the Afghan National Justice Sector Strategy[xiv]. Within these documents, traditional actors receive a lot more attention than in those of the EU and EC. In the Justice for All paper the government writes that the traditional, informal justice sector needs to be incorporated in the new Afghan judiciary system[xv]. At the same time it stresses that policy should come strictly from Kabul, and that there is a great need for the professionalization and quality of the informal system. In another document, the National Justice Sector Strategy, the importance of informal conflict resolution and informal justice actors is stressed as well[xvi]. It deems it necessary to regulate and standardize this sector, so at least a minimum of control is established. The actors should, however, remain at least part of their autonomy.  Another program, which receives the EC’s support and funds, is the UNDP’s Access to Justice program[xvii]. The informal justice sector is pointed out as extremely important in improving the Afghan justice sector, particularly because they are, at the moment, the only decently functioning judicial actors with any legitimacy amongst the Afghan people. Village elderly and other local representatives are therefor provided with workshops and courses in Afghan law, fundamental human rights and the relation between the former and the Sharia and the Qur’an. The question of how these actors should be adopted in the official Afghan justice system is left to the central government.

It is noteworthy how the EC tries to refrain from mentioning the informal judicial actors in its documents. Words like ‘traditional’ or ‘informal’ are never used when talking about this sector. The only way this topic is covered is by saying that local district functionaries need to assure that all conflict resolution are carried out conform Afghan law and should follow human rights. It is as if the Commission tries to avoid mentioning the traditional actor, even though it is clearly aware of the role they play in the current and future Afghan justice sector.

In conclusion, when it comes to the development aid directed at justice sector reform, the EU mostly focuses its funds and support on programs of other organizations, rather than creating and carrying out its own initiatives. The programs it funds and support, as we have found out, put a lot of emphasize on local, non-governmental actors that enjoy a great amount of legitimacy amongst the Afghan people (in other words: the Qawm). If we put together the analyses of the EU’s and EC’s documents with the knowledge that the EU tends to place human rights higher on it’s priority list in foreign policy than almost all other international actors, it seems that giving such a prominent role to these traditional actors is not something the EU would be likely to do. However, indirectly, Qawms play a huge role in the EU’s justice reform efforts in Afghanistan. What this will do to the human rights situation in Afghanistan remains to be seen.

Water Management in Rural Development

Regarding water management and irrigation works the role of Qawms seems, at first sight, to be less of a problem. Efficiency and effectiveness are much more important here than in the justice sector, where ethical issues play a much larger role. A first resemblance between the two areas however is the emphasize the European Commission puts in its policy papers on the fact that it mainly supports initiatives and policies of the Afghan government, instead of creating its own. The ANDS is emphasized in particular. While studying development efforts concerning water irrigation, one soon finds out that the issues has been immensely important for centuries, and that the Afghan people soon found out that the results of cooperation in this area far exceeds those of conflict and competition. For hundreds of years the so-called Mirabs, a democratically elected official concerned with the water-related businesses of a Qawm, have played an important role in the Afghan society. The Mirabs enjoy the respect of the Afghan people due to its local roots, knowledge and democratic legitimacy[xviii]. Due to their democratic and local character, and the rather a-political area with which the Mirabs are concerned, it seems like a perfect representative for the Qawm to incorporate into the Afghan governmental structures. The Afghan government doesn’t seem to agree with this logic however, as follows from the discourse analyses of the documents concerning water management.

Traditional irrigation-systems are only briefly mentioned in the interim-ANDS, which was completed in 2006, but the actors that come with those traditional systems are not called by their name. The creation of a new system (‘Community-based management of irrigation systems’) and new actors (‘Water Users’ Associations’) that are mentioned have a notable local ring to them, but traditional actors and any relation to the Qawm are not mentioned whatsoever[xix].

The European Commission seems to follow this line in its own larger policy papers, such as the Blue Book and Country Strategy Papers. The Mirab is never mentioned in the studied documents, and neither are traditional or non-governmental actors. As mentioned earlier, the Commission mentions time after time that it will, where possible and desirable, support national, Afghan policies. However, the fact that it will only support the Afghan policies ‘where possible and desirable’ shows that the Commission has a significantly different look at this policy area that at the justice sector reforms. The option to carry out its own policies and initiatives is kept open when it comes to water management. This is made clearer in a number of documents concerning small-scale water management development efforts. In a case study about the EC’s work on the development of the Kunduz River Basin, it is explained what kind of role Mirabs play within the Afghan society[xx]. They form the link between the local Afghan people, and the Afghan government. Although the Commission does not talk concretely about involving them in their policies, it is clear that it has the Mirabs in sight, and accepts their importance and legitimacy. In the notes of a workshop on rangeland management, we can read how the participants stress the importance of local and traditional actors when it comes to managing natural resources[xxi]. It is said that the local governance in reality is shared between the Qawm and the Afghan government, and that cooperation in many fields between the local, traditional actors and the governments is an absolute necessity.

In conclusion we can say that the picture is a little blurrier in the area of water management, than it is for justice sector reform. Although traditional actors, attached to Qawms, are completely ignored by the Commission and Afghan government in their broader policy papers, they do come back in the more small-scale documents about water management development efforts. The overall picture however, seems to show a greatly smaller role for traditional actors in the area of water management, than in the area of justice sector reform. This could be called strange, since the policy area is free from ethical and human rights related issues, and a democratic and legitimate actor exists within the Qawms: the Mirab.


Are, and in what way, traditional, and non-western actors cooperated in the foreign policies of the EU towards Afghanistan? That was the key question of this paper. The short answer: sometimes, and mostly indirectly. Obviously this is a not very satisfactory answer. But then again, this research should not be seen as the end, but rather as the beginning of the clarification of traditional actors’ role in foreign policies. We can, however, draw some conclusions from the research done for this paper.

For starters, the indirect role of traditional actors in the EU’s policies concerning the justice sector reforms of Afghanistan can be found strange. The EU is a strong advocate of universal human rights, and holds these in high regard when it comes to designing its foreign, and development policies. The fact that uncontrollable actors who have, at best, only a very limited respect for universal human rights, receive such a large role in such a critical area, is in direct contrast with the EU’s normal position. Although through an efficiency-lens, the incorporation of traditional actors in this policy area might seem to be a good idea, since there are so numerous and legitimate ones, ethical arguments must play a large role here as well.

Secondly, in an area that seems to be free of these ethical concerns, water and irrigation management, the EU chooses to ignore the existing traditional, democratic and professional actors that exist, following the Afghan government’s lead. The above-mentioned efficiency-lens is the only one that has to be taken into account here, and yet traditional actors lose it from the newly designed central government. This is in complete contrast to the expected effects of a case-by-case design of development and foreign policy, mentioned in the introduction of this paper.

As a round up we can say that the EU is contradictory in its use and inclusion of traditional actors, the Qawm in the case of Afghanistan, in its foreign (development) policy. The case-to-case design of development policies does not seem to enlarge their role or importance. However, this is the case for Afghanistan. More case studies are necessary to draw further conclusions in this still desolated area of foreign policy analysis.

List of Documents

- Afghan Government, (2005a). Justice for All – A Comprehensive Needs Analysis for Justice in Afghanistan. [30-03-2012, D0-A1F9-468E-8DF0-3F485F1959A7/0/JusticeforAll.pdf].   

- Afghan Government, (2005b). Peace, Reconciliation and Justice in Afghanistan Action Plan. [29-03-2012, Action_Pln_Gov_Af.pdf].

- Afghan Government, (2006). Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy – Summary Report: An Interim Strategy For Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction: [29-03-2012, Resources/ANDSSummaryRpt.pdf].

- Afghan Government, (2008a). Afghanistan National Development Strategy. [30-03-2012, KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf].

- Afghan Government, (2008b). National Justice Sector Strategy. [01-04-2012,].

- Afghan Government & UNDP, (2005). Access to Justice at the District Level. [02-04-2012, Justice/AJDL_ProDoc09.pdf].

- Afghan Compact, (2006). [01-04-2012, afghanistan_compact.pdf].

- European Commission, (2007a). Country Strategy Paper: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007-2013. [31-03-2012,].

- Europese Commissie, (2007b). Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-2010 – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. [07-04-2012, _en.pdf].

- European Commission, (2007c). Thematic Programme: Non-state actors and local authorities in development 2007-2010. [05-04-2012, what/civil-society/documents/nsa_la_strategy _paper_2007_2010_en.pdf].

- European Commission, (2008). Annual Work Programme for Grants of the European Commission: Rural Development Programme – Afghanistan. [03-04-2012, http://ec.europa .eu/europeaid/documents/awp/2009/ec_awp_af_2009_41123449_en.pdf].

- European Commission, (2009a). Annual Work Programme for Grants of the European Union: Support to Social management of Water in Afghanistan. [01-04-2012, http://ec.eur europeaid/documents/awp/2010/awp_2010_afg_p6_en.pdf].

- European Commission, (2009b). EU Blue Book 2009 – The EU and Afghanistan. [31-03-2012, bluebookafg_2009_en.pdf].

- European Commission, (2009c). State of Play – Afghanistan. [10-05-2012, http://ec.euro].

- European Commission, (2010a). State of Play – Afghanistan. [10-05-2012, http://ec.euro documents/state_of_play_afg_2010-jan.pdf].

- Europese Commissie, (2010b). Kunduz River Basin Programme: integrated water-management. [03-04-2012, afghanistan_rural-development_kunduz_en.pdf].

- European Commission, (2011a). Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan (2007-13) and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-13. [02-04-2012, multiannual_indicative_programme_2011_13_en.pdf].

- European Commission, (2011b). Thematic Programme: Non-state actors and local authorities in development 2010-2013. [02-04-2012, /finance/dci/documents/nsa-la_strategy_ 2011-2013_-_en.pdf].

- European Commission, (2011c). Proceedings of the Workshop on Developing the National Plan for Rangeland Management in Afghanistan. [Personal Copy].

- European Commission, (2011d). State of Play – Afghanistan. [11-05-2012, http://eeas.].

- European Council, (2005). EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration: Committing to a new EU-Afghan Partnership. [02-04-2012, st14519.en05.pdf].

- Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan (2007). Joint Recommendations. [12-04-2012, .pdf].

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (2005). Access to Justice at the District Level. [Personal Copy].

End Notes

[i] Barfield, T. (2010). Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[ii] Mousavi, S. (1998) The Hazaras of Afghanistan: A Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study. Richmond: Curzon.

[iii] Vogelsang, W (2010). The Afghans. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell.

[iv] Compare for example ‘Minority Rights Group International. (2001). Afghanistan: Minorities, conflict and the search for peace.’, ‘Christensen, A. (1995). Aiding Afghanistan. The Background and Prospects for Reconstruction in a Fragmented Society. Copenhagen: NiASS Press’ and ‘The Asia Foundation. (2006). A Survey of the Afghan People. Kabul: AINA’.

[v] Goodhand, J., Dennys, C. & Mansfield, D. (2012). ‘A Dangerous Peace? Drugs, Post-Conflict State Building and Horizontal Inequalities in Afghanistan’, pp. 249-274, in: A. Langer, F. Stewart & R. Venugopal (eds.), Horizontal Inequalities and Post-Conflict Development, New York: Macmillan.

[vi] Roy, O. (1989). Back to Tribalism or on to Lebanon? Third World Quarterly, 11:4, pp. 70-82 and Hart, D. (2001). Quabila. Tribes and tribe-state relations in morocco and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.

[vii] Barfield, T. (2010). Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[viii] Slaughter, S. Maj. (2010). Expanding the Qawm: Culturally Savvy Counterinsurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph:

[ix] Karzai, H. (2007). ‘Strengthening Security in Contemporary Afghanistan: Coping with the Taliban’, pp. 56-81, in: R. Rotberg (ed.), Building a New Afghanistan, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and Nojumi, N., Mazurama, D. and Stites, E. (2004). Afghanistan’s Systems of Justice: Formal, Traditional and Customary, Tufts University: Feinstein International Famine Centre.

[x] European Council, (2005). EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration: Committing to a new EU-Afghan Partnership. [02-04-2012,].

[xi] European Commission, (2007a). Country Strategy Paper: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007-2013. [31-03-2012,].

[xii] University of Texas Libraries:


[xiii] A complete list of documents can be found in Annex A.

[xiv] Europese Commissie, (2007b). Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-2010 – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. [07-04-2012, 07_13 _en.pdf] and European Commission, (2009b). EU Blue Book 2009 – The EU and Afghanistan. [31-03-2012, /content/eu_ bluebookafg_2009_en.pdf]

[xv] Afghan Government, (2005a). Justice for All – A Comprehensive Needs Analysis for Justice in Afghanistan. [30-03-2012, D0-A1F9-468E-8DF0-3F485F1959A7/0/JusticeforAll.pdf]

[xvi] Afghan Government, (2008b). National Justice Sector Strategy. [01-04-2012, http://info.public].

[xvii] Afghan Government & UNDP, (2005). Access to Justice at the District Level. [02-04-2012, http://www.un Justice/AJDL_ProDoc09.pdf].

[xviii] Anderson, I. (2006). Watermanagement, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Irrigation Systems. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, Afghanistan and Pain, A. (2004). Understanding Village Institutions: Case Studies on Watermanagement from Faryab and Saripul. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, Afghanistan.

[xix] Afghan Government, (2006). Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy – Summary Report: An Interim Strategy For Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction: [29-03-2012,].

[xx] Europese Commissie, (2010b). Kunduz River Basin Programme: integrated water-management. [03-04-2012, afghanistan_rural-development_ kunduz_en.pdf].

[xxi] European Commission, (2011c). Proceedings of the Workshop on Developing the National Plan for Rangeland Management in Afghanistan. [Personal Copy].


About the Author(s)

Wouter van Acker (1989) graduated cum laude in Public Administration and International and Comparative Politics, both received from the University of Leuven (Belgium). He finished his Bachelor’s degree in Political Science at the Radboud University Nijmegen (the Netherlands).