Assessing Mombasa’s Credentials as a Battleground in Kenya’s War on Terror
The sequential, mysterious assassinations of high profile Muslim clerics in Mombasa over a period of two years (2012-2014) has elevated that coastal city’s status as a critical battleground in Kenya’s war on terror. These unresolved murders have occurred against the backdrop of Mombasa grabbing the spotlight as the scene of the 2002 Al Qaeda attacks on Israeli interests in the region and the emergence of allegations by Kenyan authorities, the United States and the United Nations linking some of the area’s leading Islamist ideologues to insurgent activity in the Horn of Africa. However, the challenge in understanding the roots of the city’s restiveness is that its alleged role in fomenting transnational insurgent activity sits side-by-side with its secessionist tendencies. To that effect, it is difficult to determine which of the two factors contributes more to instability in the area. In this article, the author attributes Mombasa’s restiveness to its status as a link between religious/secessionist tensions in the coastal region of Kenya and contradictions fuelling Jihadist campaigns in the Horn of Africa and beyond. The implication of this finding is that the key to stabilizing Mombasa lies in resolving both the domestic and regional/international contradictions fuelling its state of restiveness.
In the post-Cold War era, Kenya has emerged as one of East Africa’s hotspots for terrorist attacks mounted by radical Islamist groups. Since 1998, terrorist operatives have conducted high profile attacks that have elevated the country’s profile as a critical theatre in the Global War On Terror (GWOT). Among others, in 1998, suspected operatives of Al Qaeda, a global Islamist terrorist franchise, bombed the United States (US) embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; four years later, the same organization masterminded the bombing of Paradise Hotel and attempted to shoot down an Arkia Airlines aeroplane in the Kenyan coastal city of Mombasa. More recently, in 2013, operatives of Al Shabaab, an affiliate of Al Qaeda, mounted a brazen attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. In the East African region, Kenya as a target of Islamist militant groups is only rivalled by Uganda which has had to contend with the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) insurgency in the western part of the country and attacks mounted by Al Shabaab.
Although attacks in Kenya have occurred in Nairobi and the north eastern part of the country, Mombasa has grabbed the spotlight as the country’s terrorism and counterterrorism focal area. The city’s apparent credentials primarily derive from its being the scene of the 2002 Al Qaeda attacks and a suspected springboard for operatives who were involved in the Westgate attack and some of those participating in the Al Shabaab insurgency in Somalia. The Al Qaeda attacks would seem to link Mombasa’s state of instability to contradictions fuelling the global Jihadist campaign. However, this notion is unsettled by the area’s secessionist tendencies. Mombasa is part of the wider coastal region that seeks to break away from Kenya due to the alleged economic neglect of the area and the marginalization of Muslims who are a minority in the country. In this regard, domestic politics contributes to the area’s restiveness as much as external political contradictions.
Against this background, this article examines the credentials of Mombasa as a battleground in Kenya’s war on terror. The central argument is that the city occupies that space that links Kenya’s religious and secessionist tensions with the political contradictions fuelling the global Jihadist campaign. Due to the historical, political, socio-economic and geographical factors shaping this space, Mombasa has evolved into a hub for the propagation of militant Islamist activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Whereas the state denies responsibility, the recent mysterious, targeted assassination of prominent Muslim clerics in the city has created a perception among the Muslim community that the state has adopted a religiously-motivated extrajudicial approach to countering terrorism in the area. Thus, the attacks in Mombasa, militant Islamist activity in the area and the perceived state response to this phenomenon constitute a start-up benchmark for designating Mombasa as a battleground in Kenya’s war on terror.
This article is organized as follows: The next section examines the historical, geo-political and socio-economic factors that have shaped the evolution of Mombasa. This analysis is followed by an assessment of the city’s status as a leadership, recruitment, indoctrinational, logistical and operational centre for militant Islamist activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. The author then assesses the Kenyan state’s counterterrorism strategy in Mombasa before briefly discussing this case’s implications for the stability of Kenya.
Roots of Instability in Mombasa
The geo-political factors that shaped the early historical development of Mombasa reinforce the dynamics underpinning the uneasy relations between the Kenyan central government and the coastal region as well as those that triggered off the global Jihadist campaign in the post-Cold War era. Between the 15th and 17th centuries, the control of Mombasa was contested by Portuguese and Omani Arabs. During that era, the Suez Canal that connected Europe to Asia by sea had not yet been constructed. Thus, for European merchant ships that had to sail around Africa enroute to India, Mombasa was a highly strategic transit point given its location along the East African coast. In order for European mercantile interests to have controlled the Indian Ocean trade routes, they had to displace the Arabs from Oman who had already settled along the East African coast, intermarried with the indigenous people, introduced Islam and controlled Mombasa. For 200 years, starting in the late 15th century, the Portuguese were able to establish a presence in Mombasa where they built Fort Jesus to defend the port against attacks by the Arabs. The Portuguese were later to be defeated by the Arabs who re-occupied Mombasa and during the colonial era, ceded its control to the British.
From the above exposition, it can be deduced that Mombasa was founded against the backdrop of a competition for global power and influence between the Euro-Christian and Arab-Muslim civilizations. Significantly, its early contact with the outside world laid the foundation for religious and secessionist tensions in Kenya which reinforced the clash of civilizations which had shaped its founding. Since its early contact with the Arabs, the coastal region of Kenya has evolved into a distinct area with a cultural heritage underpinned by Islamic, Arab and indigenous African traditions. This contrasts sharply with the hinterland that is populated by indigenous Africans mainly belonging to Christian denominations. In terms of how this religious factor has unfolded demographically, Kenya is predominantly Christian, with Muslims accounting for 11% of the population, mainly inhabiting the area along the country’s border with Somalia and the coastal region of which Mombasa is a part.
Whereas the above factor in itself would not have been sufficient to trigger off religious tensions in Mombasa, the area is restive because sections of its population believe that the central government is economically marginalizing it. Apart from being a favourite destination for foreign tourists, Mombasa serves as a port for some of the countries of East Africa. Yet, despite its significant contribution to the national coffers, a section of the coastal population believes that the area is getting a raw deal. The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) seeks the region’s secession from Kenya in light of the argument that the government has economically neglected the area; its population wallows in poverty; unemployment levels are high; and the resources of Mombasa are controlled by non-natives.
On another score, Mombasa is restive because her secessionist demands collide with allegations by Kenyan officials linking the MRC leadership to Al Shabaab. Given this development, it becomes difficult to ignore the area’s religious identity as a critical factor underpinning the uneasy relations between the central government and the coastal region. If it is true that Mombasa is a sanctuary for Al Shabaab, then its Islamic heritage and Al Shabaab’s radical Islamist agenda would presumably be the elements linking the two. However, this notion would be contested on grounds that an Islamic heritage is not always synonymous with a militant Islamist agenda. For example, MRC, an organization based in a predominantly Muslim area has dissociated itself from Al Shabaab, a militant Islamist group. If the MRC position is true and the government knows it, then the state is using a ‘terrorism scare’ to shoot down the region’s demand for equitable control of its resources. And if sections of Mombasa’s population attribute the area’s woes to state-instigated religious marginalization, then Islam would most likely be the doctrine around which it would rally to contest the authority of the state. In this sense, an evolving Islamist insurrection would be directed against a state largely dominated by Christians. That development would consolidate Mombasa’s history as an area shaped by a Muslim-Christian divide.
Like the case of Mombasa’s restiveness, the clash of civilizations has also partly been at the heart of the onset of the post-Cold War confrontation between the West and radical Islamist groups. Although during the Cold War, the two sides were unified in their opposition to communism, when the Berlin wall fell, inherent ideological differences in their alliance precipitated a clash between them. Whereas the West espoused the principles of a free market economy and liberal democratic values, radical Islamist groups were intent on installing governments based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law. A critical flashpoint in relations between the two sides manifested during Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, home to some of Islam’s holiest shrines, accepted the deployment of US forces on its soil to stave off a probable Iraqi invasion. This development precipitated a deterioration in relations between the Saudi monarchy and Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, who saw the presence of American soldiers as a desecration of the Islamic holy lands. The fall-out between bin Laden and the House of Saud was a critical starting point in Al Qaeda launching a war against the West.
Also relations between the erstwhile anti-communist allies were not helped by the West’s apparent double-standards in cooperating with regimes in predominantly Muslim countries which were not embracing democracy. For example, France (a western country) was not emphatic in its condemnation of the Algerian government after it prematurely terminated the elections of 1992 that were on the verge of ushering in a government run by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). As a result, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) insurgency, one of three rebellions that resulted from the botched up elections, not only targeted the Algerian establishment but also France. In this vein, ideological contradictions in the defunct anti-communist alliance and inconsistency in the West’s promotion of its ideals abroad partly constituted a basis for radical Islamist groups launching a world wide Jihad against so called moderate Muslim regimes and the countries of the West.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the founding of Mombasa, its shaky relations with the Kenyan central government and the international Jihadist campaign have all been shaped by a global competition for power and influence pitting the Euro-Christian countries of the West and state and non-state actors propagating Islamist ideals. Mombasa is unstable because it seats at the intersection between the domestic and international manifestations of this confrontation. In this context, rebellions abroad that are spurred by radical Islamist ideals favourably fit in with the religious tensions that define Mombasa’s uneasy relations with the Kenyan central government.
Mombasa’s Credentials as a Terrorism/Counterterrorism Hotspot
Having examined how certain historical, political and socio-economic factors have shaped Mombasa’s restiveness, this section assesses its credentials as a battleground in Kenya’s war on terror. Given the religious tensions underpinning Mombasa’s relations with the Kenyan central government and some parallels in the contradictions fuelling the conflict in Somalia (a country neighbouring Kenya), Mombasa has evolved into a critical leadership, recruitment, indoctrinational, logistical and operational centre for militant Islamist activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa.
Whereas there may be other parts of Kenya that are home to fiery Islamist preachers, in recent times, Mombasa has emerged as the defacto seat of the radical Islamist movement in the country. The city hosts the Masjid Musa mosque which was the base for three fiery Muslim clerics: Aboud Rogo Muhammad, Ibrahim ‘Rogo’ Omar and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed also known as Makaburi. Prior to being killed, all three preachers were linked to Al Shabaab. In June 2012, the US imposed sanctions on Aboud Rogo for allegedly supporting the Somali insurgent group. Pursuing almost similar measures, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) instituted a travel ban on Rogo and froze his assets; Makaburi was targeted likewise: the UNSC imposed sanctions on him for being “a leading facilitator and recruiter for young Kenyan Muslims for violent activity in Somalia.”
In a way, the three clerics were targeted because the US and UN saw them as leaders around whom the radical Islamist community in Kenya was engaging in transnational insurgent activity. However, in order to authenticate the US and UN conclusions, it would have to be proven that these preachers held radical views and were committed to directing the transnational propagation of these ideals. Confirming his own commitment to a strict interpretation of Islam, Makaburi notes that “There is no such a thing as a moderate Muslim. The prophets did not teach us moderation in Islam—Islam is Islam….Being a moderate Muslim is accepting what your enemies want you to be.” Whereas Makaburi held such a conservative world view, in itself, this would not have been sufficient to prove that he was using it to shape the political landscape in Somalia. It would have to be proven that he aided Al Shabaab in some way. In showing the active role Mombasa clerics play in the Somali conflict, the BBC’s Peter Taylor reveals that “…would-be Jihadis, whatever their national origin, do not chance upon the route for themselves, but are actively guided along it by radical preachers like Makaburi.”
Whereas the case of Makaburi shows that there are individuals in Mombasa who are openly committed to coordinating Islamist insurgent activities in East Africa, Mombasa’s credentials as a leadership centre for this movement have largely been validated by the mysterious, sequential assassination of Rogo, Omar and Makaburi. Although the Kenyan government denies responsibility for these murders, the Muslim population in Mombasa blames it. Supposedly, from its perspective, the state would have had an interest in eliminating the three preachers given their open support for Al Shabaab, an insurgent group that had conducted attacks in Kenya in retaliation for the East African country sending troops to Somalia to shore up the government there. Also, in light of the religious dimension to the tensions between the central government and the coastal region, the state would presumably have been weary of the clerics’ teachings further fuelling Mombasa’s secessionist tendencies. Whether or not the state had a hand in the assassinations, the significance in the demise of the three clerics is that it raises the profile of Mombasa as both a breeding and liquidation ground for leading radical Islamist ideologues.
If we accept the proposition that Mombasa is a leadership centre for the radical Islamist movement in Kenya, then this status should have a knock-on effect of making the area a hub for the recruitment and indoctrination of Islamist insurgents. According to the United Nations (UN), more than 500 Kenyan youths have been recruited to participate in the Al Shabaab insurgency. Given the connection between the slain clerics’ fiery sermons and allegations linking them to Al Shabaab, it is plausible to assert that Mombasa, the city where they were based, has made a significant contribution to the enlistment figures cited by the world body. While insurgents may not necessarily be recruited from their areas of origin, it is intriguing to note that there are multiple cases of Kenyan insurgent-suspects hailing from Mombasa:
In June, 2013, Kenyan authorities reported that Fuad Abubaker Manswab, a key terror suspect hailing from Majengo in Mombasa had joined Al Shabaab. Two years earlier, he had been arrested together with Jermaine Grant, a British national, for planning terrorist attacks in Mombasa; in September 2013, five Kenyan youths from Kisauni and Majengo were apprehended and sentenced to six months in jail for being in Somalia illegally. A relative of one of the suspects revealed that he had been recruited into Al Shabaab; the following month, a 19 year old resident of Kisauni, Mombasa was interrogated by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police on suspicions of having communicated with the Westgate Mall attackers.
The above examples point to the Kisauni and Majengo areas of Mombasa as probable recruiting grounds for Al Shabaab. Incidentally, the Masjid Musa mosque is located in this predominantly Muslim neighbourhood of Mombasa. If we adopt the proposition that the blacklisted clerics’ sermons have had a profound indoctrinational impact in the city, then this has mainly been felt in areas that are not only proximate to the mosque but also those predominantly with a religious identity at the heart of uneasy relations between the coastal region and the central government. And as earlier argued, some similarities between the contradictions fuelling restiveness in Mombasa and some conflicts abroad reinforce the area’s state of instability. When Sheikh Rogo was murdered, Al Shabaab attempted to draw parallels between its struggle and what it saw as the plight of Muslims in Kenya. The group linked the cleric’s death to a religiously motivated plan by the Kenyan government to marginalize Muslims. Al Shabaab’s calculation was that its ideology (based on a plan to establish an Islamist theocracy in Somalia) would resonate well with the ostensibly marginalized Muslim population of Mombasa and Kenya at large. Apparently, this would in turn accord the Somali group much needed external support for its insurgent campaign.
With the emergence of an ideological bridge connecting insurrectional tendencies in Kenya and the conflict in Somalia, the centrality of Mombasa to this nexus has allowed the area to evolve into a sanctuary, logistical and operational hub for Islamist insurgent activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. As a sanctuary, Mombasa has not only hosted indigenous but also foreign Jihadists. For example, Manswab was arrested and charged alongside, Jermaine Grant, a British national. Also, according to Kenyan intelligence sources, Samantha Lethwaite, another British national and wife to one of the operatives responsible for the London suicide attacks of 2005, lived in an exclusive villa in Mombasa while plotting terrorist attacks. The reported activities of these foreign fighters showcase Mombasa’s significance as a battleground in the wider Jihadist campaign. The city’s credentials as a sanctuary for radical Islamists are further evidenced by its hosting an Al Shabaab terror cell, of which Lethwaite is a ‘logistician.’ Coordinated by Abdulkadir Muhammed Abdulkadir also known as Ikrima, this cell also includes Fahmi Jamal Salim who is believed to be married to Lethwaite. If it is true that Lethwaite is an Al Shabaab ‘logistician’ and she once lived in Mombasa, then it is plausible to deduce that the area’s restiveness has created an environment conducive for organizing and supporting Islamist insurgent activity in Kenya and beyond.
Having assessed Mombasa’s role in the organization of Islamist insurgent activity in the region, it is also important to examine why some attacks have particularly been conducted in this area. Given Mombasa’s status as a strategic port along the East African coast and its tourist attractions, attacks on it would have serious economic ramifications in Kenya and beyond. This outcome would be welcomed by Islamist insurgents in Kenya and abroad seeking spotlight for their agenda. The city also presents radical Islamist groups with some symbolic targets. Mombasa is a popular tourist destination for Israeli nationals. In relation to the 2002 attacks in the city, operatives targeted an Arkia Airlines aeroplane with Israelis on board and Paradise Hotel that, according to James Bennet, had a kosher restaurant, a synagogue and torah scrolls. From Bennet’s report, it is apparent that the facilities at Paradise Hotel were mainly tailored to host Israeli tourists. A senior official of Israel’s Shin Bet security agency observed that had the two attacks fully succeeded, 300 to 400 Israelis would have lost their lives.
The primacy of Israeli interests in Kenya as a target of radical Islamist groups stems from the following premises: First, the Palestinians’ struggle for statehood has cast Israel and the Western countries that support the Jewish state (mainly the US) as the principle stumbling block to the aspirations of the Palestinians. As a result, predominantly Arab and Muslim state and non-state actors that share an ethno-religious identity with the Palestinians and empathize with their struggle for self-determination have, over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, variously rallied in opposition to Israel and her allies. Although not swayed by ethno-religious considerations, during the Cold War, some radical leftist groups originating from Germany and Japan also worked closely with Palestinian terrorist organizations in targeting what they saw as Western imperialism and its ostensible support for the Jewish state. In this connection, the endurance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the post-Cold War era; the heightening of religious tensions as one of the drivers for both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the uneasy relations between the Kenyan central government and the coastal region; and the existence of Israeli interests in Mombasa have all combined to constitute the city into an attractive target for radical Islamist groups.
Second, the existence of Israeli interests in Kenya presents radical Islamist groups with the opportunity to hurt Kenya not only for her ostensible marginalization of Muslims but also her enduring cordial relations with Israel. With the author having already looked at religious tensions in the country, the focus in this paragraph shifts to the relevance of Israel-Kenya relations to this debate. Historically, the two countries have had cordial relations to the extent that when terrorist operatives of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC) and the German leftist group Baader-Meinhoff hijacked an aeroplane mainly carrying Israeli nationals and diverted it to Uganda in 1976, the squadron of Israeli military planes involved in Operation Thunderbolt (the rescue mission) refuelled in Kenya. Kenya’s role in Operation Thunderbolt positioned her as an ally of the Jewish state and by extension, an adversary of all those opposed to its existence.
This explains why in the aftermath of Operation Thunderbolt, an Arab group masterminded the bombing of Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi apparently to punish Kenya for her role in the 1976 hostage rescue mission. Also, although Al Qaeda is widely suspected to have organized and executed the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, in Lebanon, a group known as the Army of Palestine claimed responsibility for the attacks. The significance of this claim is the connection between the name of the group and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on one hand and the targeting of Israeli interests in Kenya on the other. If that group’s claim was true, then at that time, Mombasa emerged as one of the theatres within which the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was playing out. It is then plausible to deduce that the location (and by some respects, the concentration) of Israeli interests in Mombasa (an area at the intersection of the domestic and international manifestations of the global conflict between the West and radical Islamist groups) has constituted the Kenyan coastal city into an attractive spot for terrorist attacks.
Responding to the spectre of terrorism, the Kenyan state has reinforced Mombasa’s status as a bridge between secessionist tensions in the coastal region and Jihadist campaigns abroad. In this direction, Kenyan officials have linked MRC to Al Shabaab. This strategy has served to de-legitimize and criminalize the grievances of sections of the population in Mombasa thereby presenting the state with a basis for going after those individuals it has designated as security threats. The state’s overt response to terrorism in Mombasa has mainly involved the arrest and indictment of terror suspects: In December, 2011, Manswab, Grant, Warder Breikh Islam (Grant’s wife) and Frank Ngala were arrested and charged for among others, possessing explosives and preparing to commit felony; nearly two years later, a Mombasa court charged Swaleh Abdalla for planning to conduct terror attacks in Kenya. Since 2004, Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police had been monitoring his movements after he had allegedly joined Al Shabaab.
In some cases where suspects have been deemed to be prepared to resist arrest, the state security apparatus has not hesitated to use lethal force. In May 2013, Kenyan police killed Khalid Ahmed in an exchange of gunfire at his mother’s house in Mombasa. Ahmed was a Somali national who had undergone paramilitary training in Somalia before sneaking into Kenya. Whereas the state can officially point to the above examples as representative of its ‘rule-of-law’ response to terrorism in Mombasa, the sequential assassination of high profile Muslim clerics against the backdrop of the attempted criminalization of MRC activities has led sections of the Muslim population to believe that the state is simultaneously running a covert counterterrorism programme that entails the targeted liquidation of terror suspects.
In this article, the author set out to assess the status of Mombasa as a battleground in Kenya’s war on terror. To that effect, the historical, geo-political and socio-economic factors shaping the area’s evolution have been reviewed. In addition, the author has examined Mombasa’s credentials as a leadership, recruitment, indoctrinational, logistical and operational centre for Islamist insurgent activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa as well as the state’s response to the city’s emergence as a terrorism focal area.
Mombasa is restive because it seats at the intersection between religious/secessionist tensions in the coastal region of Kenya and contradictions fuelling the global Jihadist campaign. Due to this status, the area has evolved into a hub for the propagation of radical Islamist ideals which in some cases, has translated into attacks on targets deemed to be at variance with these beliefs. In responding to the upsurge in terrorist attacks in Mombasa, the connection between the domestic and transnational roots of instability in the city has accorded the Kenyan state the leverage to partially criminalize and de-legitimize the area’s demands for self determination. With this development, it has since been difficult for the state to shake off allegations that it is running a covert counterterrorism programme involving the extra-judicial killing of prominent Muslim clerics some of whose pronouncements are not only aimed at shaping the political landscape in neighbouring countries but also inadvertently challenge the authority of the Kenyan government.
Against this backdrop, the key to stabilizing Mombasa then lies not only in resolving the contradictions at the heart of uneasy relations between the coastal region and the Kenyan central government but also ending the global Jihadist campaign. While it is plausible for the government to address the former issue, the latter is almost beyond its reach. With regard to the former, the government could water down Mombasa’s secessionist tendencies by instituting programmes that promote country wide political and socio-economic inclusiveness. Resolving the contradictions fuelling the global Jihadist campaign is almost an insurmountable task. For example, Kenya would have to work with among others, the governments of Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, Algeria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan to end the conflicts in those countries.
In relation to the global Jihadist campaign, Kenya has adopted a more realistic approach of trying to stabilize the political situation of one her neighbours—Somalia. In 2011, Kenya sent 4,000 troops to Somalia to shore up the government there. Although this move dismantled some of Al Shabaab’s insurgent infrastructure, it backfired by motivating the Somali group to conduct terrorist attacks inside Kenya to punish the East African country for its regional interventionist policy. In seeking to stabilize Mombasa then, Kenya is caught between a rock and a hard place. If it only chooses to address the domestic dimension to the city’s restiveness, the regional/global one will still serve as a source of instability in the area. If it opts to address both dimensions (as it is currently doing), it risks a backlash (as is currently the case).
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003, The War on Terrorism: Remembering the Losses of KENBOM/TANBOM, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, August. Available at: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/august/kenbom_080603. Accessed on 31/03/2014
 BBC 2002, ‘Kenya Terror Strikes Target Israelis,’ BBC News, 28th November, 2002. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2522207.stm Accessed on 18/11/2013
 Brady Dennis 2014, Interview: On the Ground in Kenya. Part 2: Terror at the Westgate Mall, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10th January. Available at: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/january/a-conversation-with-our-legal-attache-in-nairobi-part-2. Accessed on 03/02/2014
 Delany Max and Straziuso Jason 2010, ‘Uganda Bomb Attacks Kill World Cup Fans: Al Shabaab Suspected In Kampala Explosions,’ Huffington Post, 12th July. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/11/uganda-bomb-world-cup_n_642336.html. Accessed on 19/01/2012; on the ADF insurgency, see: Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, Uganda’s Rising Threat: The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. Available at: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/ugandas-rising-threat-allied-democratic-forces-adf. Accessed on 16/05/2014
 The Westgate Mall attack occurred in Nairobi. See: BBC 2013, ‘Nairobi siege: How the attack happened,’ BBC News Africa, 18th October. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24189116. Accessed on 04/02/2014; on terrorist attacks in north eastern Kenya, see: Ombati Cyrus 2011, ‘Al Shabaab launch fresh bomb attack in Mandera,’ Standard Digital, 16th March. Available at: http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000031273/al-shabaab-launch-fresh-bomb-attack-in-mandera. Accessed on 16/05/2014
 BBC 2002, op cit; Correspondent 2013, ‘Suspect charged in Mombasa over terror links,’ Capital News, 11th October. Available at: http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/10/suspect-charged-in-mombasa-over-terror-links/. Accessed on 16/11/2013; Onsarigo, Calvins 2013, ‘Four Terror Suspects Under Police Radar in Mombasa,’ The Star, 26th September. Available at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-137377/four-terror-suspects-under-police-radar-mombasa. Accessed 16/11/2013
Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, ‘Kenya Coast Secessionists Play on Fear of Outsiders—The Wabara,’ The Guardian, 6th September. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/06/kenya-ocean-coast-secessionist-party. Accessed on 18/11/2013; Nzwili, Frederick 2012, ‘Mombasa Riots Deepen Concern About Religious Tensions in Kenya,’ The Christian Science Monitor, 28th August. Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0828/Mombasa-riots-deepen-concern-about-religious-tensions-in-Kenya. Accessed 16/11/2013; Chitwood, Ken 2013, ‘Long An Oasis of Christian-Muslim Calm, Kenya May See More Strife,’ Religious News Service, 8th October. Available at: http://www.religionnews.com/2013/10/08/long-oasis-christian-muslim-calm-kenya-may-see-strife/. Accessed on 16/11/2013
 Nzwili, Frederick 2012, op cit.
 Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, op cit.
 Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, op cit; Quarshie, Hugh, The Story of Africa: The Swahili, BBC World Service. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/index_section5.shtml. Accessed on 28/11/2013
 Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, op cit; UNESCO, Fort Jesus, Mombasa, World Heritage List. Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1295. Accessed on 14/04/2014
 On the clash of civilizations, see: Brooks David 2011, ‘Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations Revisited,’ The New York Times, 3rd March. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/04brooks.html?_r=0. Accessed on 16/05/2014
Quarshie, Hugh, op cit
 Chitwood, Ken 2013, op cit
Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, op cit
 On the clash of civilizations, see: Brooks David 2011, op cit
 On US support for radical Islamist groups, see: Global Research, Sleeping with the Devil: How US and Saudi Backing of Al Qaeda Led to 9/11, Global Research, Center for Research on Globalization. Available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/sleeping-with-the-devil-how-u-s-and-saudi-backing-of-al-qaeda-led-to-911/5303313. Accessed on 03/04/2014
 Muskus Jeff 2011, Osama bin Laden Dead: The Rise, Fall and Legacy of America’s Most Wanted Terrorist, The World Post, 2nd May. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-killed-legacy_n_856138.html. Accessed on 03/04/2014
 On the botched up 1992 elections, see: BBC 2014, Algeria Profile, BBC News, March. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118856. Accessed on 31/03/2014; on the French government’s lukewarm response to the 1992 elections, see: Ahmed Nafeez, Algeria and the Paradox of Democracy: The 1992 Coup, its Consequences and the Contemporary Crisis, Algeria-Watch. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/articles/1997_2000/paradox_democracy.htm. Accessed on 16/05/2014
 On the GIA insurgency, see: Vriens Lauren 2009, Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists), Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, 27th May. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/algeria/armed-islamic-group-algeria-islamists/p9154. Accessed on 31/03/2014
 BBC 2013, ‘Mombasa Riots After Kenyan Cleric Ibrahim Omar Killed,’ BBC News, 4th October. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24398548. Accessed on 16/11/2013; Nzwili, Frederick 2012, op cit; Aljazeera 2014, ‘Kenyan Muslim cleric shot dead,’ Aljazeera. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/kenyan-muslim-cleric-shot-dead-20144117408714193.html. Accessed on 09/04/2014
 Nzwili, Frederick 2012, op cit
 BBC 2013, ‘Mombasa Riots After Kenyan Cleric Ibrahim Omar Killed,’ op cit
BBC 2013, ‘Mombasa Riots After Kenyan Cleric Ibrahim Omar Killed,’ op cit; Nzwili, Frederick 2012, op cit; Aljazeera 2014, op cit
 Yusuf Muhammad 2013, ‘Former Al Shabaab member to testify against alleged recruiter,’ Voice of America, 31st October. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/former-kenyan-al-shabab-member-to-testify-against-alleged-recruiter/1780971.html. Accessed 16/11/2013.
 The Herald 2013, ‘Terror Suspect Joins Al Shabaab,’ The Herald, 11th June. Available at: http://www.herald.co.zw/terror-suspect-joins-al-shabaab/. Accessed on 16/11/2013.
 Onsarigo, Calvins 2013, op cit
 Correspondent 2013, op cit
 BBC 2013, ‘Mombasa Riots After Kenyan Cleric Ibrahim Omar Killed,’ op cit
 Nzwili, Frederick 2012, op cit.
 The Herald 2013, op cit
 Fox News 2013, ‘Journal Connects ‘‘White Widow’ to Al Shabaab Terror Group,’ Fox News, 13th October. Available at: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/10/13/journal-connects-britain-white-widow-to-al-shabaab-terror-group/. Accessed on 16/11/2013.
 Bennet, James 2002, ‘In Kenya, 3 Suicide bombers attack hotel owned by Israelis; Missiles fired at passenger jet,’ The New York Times, 28th November. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/28/international/middleeast/28CND-KENYA.html. Accessed 18/11/2002
 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Terrorist Organization Profile: Japanese Red Army (JRA), University of Maryland. Available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=59. Accessed on 16/05/2014; BBC 2007, ‘Who were the Baader-Meinhof Gang?’ BBC News, 12th February. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6314559.stm. Accessed on 16/05/2014; BBC, ‘1976: Israelis rescue Entebbe Hostages,’ BBC, On this day, 4th July. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/4/newsid_2786000/2786967.stm.
Accessed on 16/05/2014
 Correll John 2010, ‘Entebbe,’ Air Force Magazine, Vol 93 No 12, December. Available at: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/December%202010/1210Entebbe.aspx. Accessed on 16/05/2014
 Laing Aislinn 2013, ‘Nairobi Assault: Kenyan Terrorist Attacks Since 1980,’ The Telegraph, 21st September. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/10325230/Nairobi-assault-Kenyan-terrorist-attacks-since-1980.html. Accessed on 16/05/2014
 BBC 2002, ‘Kenya Terror Strikes Target Israelis,’ op cit
 Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, op cit
 The Herald 2013, op cit
 Correspondent 2013, op cit
 The Daily Star, 2013, ‘Kenya Police Kill Terrorist Linked to Al Shabaab,’ 26th May. Available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/International/2013/May-26/218409-kenya-police-kill-terrorist-linked-to-al-shabab.ashx#axzz2knsfVwus. Accessed on 16/11/2013
 BBC 2013, ‘Kenya military names Westgate mall attack suspects,’ BBC News Africa, 5th October. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24412315. Accessed on 04/02/2014
 Taylor, Peter 2013, op cit; Shephard Michelle 2014, ‘Kenya mall attackers had simple plan, sources say,’ The Star.com, 10th January. Available at: http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/01/10/kenya_mall_attackers_had_simple_plan_sources_say.html. Accessed on 23/01/2014