Small Wars Journal


Assessment of French Intervention in the Sahel Region, 2013-2019

Mon, 08/12/2019 - 7:01am
Despite the initial success of Operation Serval in 2013, French intervention in the Sahel region has now reached impasse. The already intricate situation is further complicated by France’s status as a former colonizer operating in the region. Understanding how France’s former colonial status translates into relationships between local communities, French troops, and armed terrorist groups will influence long term engagement.

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Assessment of the Efficacy of the French Military Intervention in the Northern Mali Conflict

Mon, 05/13/2019 - 1:22am
This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which runs from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019. The French military intervention in the Northern Mali Conflict in 2013 (Operation Serval) was a military success and met the criteria for success established by civilian leadership, however, it did not alter the trajectory of conflict in the region. It subsequently became conjoined to a United Nations liberal peacebuilding effort in Mali with low prospects for rapid success, resulting in a lengthy “forever war” in the Sahel.

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50 Years after Algeria: America’s Endgame in Afghanistan

Thu, 07/05/2012 - 1:53am

THIS JULY 5th, France and Algeria marked the fiftieth anniversary of the latter’s independence. An inglorious seven-year war against a nationalist insurgency was brought to a close by President Charles de Gaulle, and with it, the last significant chapter of Western colonialism in the Arab world.

French efforts to “pacify” Algeria were politically doomed despite growing military successes on the ground. Four long years before the 1962 Evian Accords were signed with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the incumbent de Gaulle had concluded that the costs of maintaining the colony had come to outweigh the benefits to Metropolitan France. The war had been socially divisive (leading to a coup against the Fourth Republic), geopolitically counterproductive (isolating France from her NATO allies while creating enmity in the Arab world), and economically disastrous.

De Gaulle wished for a “responsible” pull-out. Subject to a popular referendum, Algeria would be granted its independence in exchange for the promise that France would continue to have access to the naval installations, nuclear sites and gas fields she had invested in there, and that the former colony would not turn into a Soviet proxy-state.

Fifty years later, the United States, which had once been very critical of French objectives in Algeria, would yearn for an analogous conclusion to her own protracted war in Afghanistan.

The general impression of the Algerian War today is that the French lost their colony because the indigenous population kicked them out. The plain truth, however, is that the French were not ousted from Algeria, anymore than the Americans were ousted from Iraq, or will soon be “ousted” from Afghanistan.

Setting the conditions for a “responsible” exit from Algeria in 1962 had required the French to bleed soldiers and treasury for years after the political decision had been made to withdraw. We are seeing the same eerie phenomenon repeat itself in Afghanistan. There, the irony of fighting against insurgencies abroad is emerging in full force; the counterinsurgent’s exit hinges on negotiating with the insurgent he continues to fight.

De Gaulle had negotiated with the FLN from a position of relative weakness; for despite France’s military successes on the ground, her political desire to withdraw was well known to all. The United States is confronted with a similar weakness in Afghanistan. Insurgent groups – the Taliban especially – have capitalized on NATO’s urgency to leave. The Taliban have come to realize that intransigence (to the point of killing negotiators – a recurring theme in Afghan history) will offer the better long-term yield. The more the Taliban wait, the more U.S.–NATO position will become desperate.

One hopes that the difference between Algeria and Afghanistan will lie in the degree to which the insurgent accedes to power in the aftermath of the foreign power’s withdrawal. In Algeria, despite promises of constitutional elections, the FLN had been allowed to achieve quasi-dictatorial control over the entire country following the French pull-out. The repercussions of a similar scenario being repeated in Afghanistan could be worse still. The Taliban’s record of governance offers bleak prospects for Afghanistan's sectarian stability, and more broadly, for the stability of Pakistan and the entire region. The tragedy of such an endgame would lie in the amount of blood and tears spilt by all sides only to yield results that could have been obtained – it will seem in hindsight – without paying such a tribute.

In Afghanistan, it remains to be seen whether the population will muster the strength to reject Taliban rule in the South on the morrow of an American withdrawal, or whether it will cave to the terror and fanaticism imposed by a few, thereby remaining cut-off from the rest of the world.

When national security imperatives or humanitarian concerns justify the toppling of a regime in the future, it is hoped that all efforts towards achieving a revolution from within will first be exhausted prior to contemplating an invasion. Otherwise, the insurgents, regardless of the merits of their banner-cause, will encounter no shortage of recruits to fight against the foreign occupiers of their lands and the perceived domestic lackeys they support.

Afghan Blowback in France

Mon, 04/09/2012 - 8:35am

Mohammed Merah, a young radicalized Frenchman, traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2010 and 2011.  Over an eight-day period in March 2012, he killed three military personnel, three Jewish children, and one Jewish teacher in a shooting spree that horrified and shocked the French nation.  On March 11, he shot dead Staff Sergeant Imad Ibn Ziaten in a parking lot in broad daylight. Four days later, on March 15, he killed first class private Mohammed Legouad and Lance Corporal Abel Chenouf and wounds seriously Lance Corporal Loic Lieber in a small strip mall near their barracks amidst a crowd of bystanders. On March 19, he killed three Jewish children and a Jewish teacher as they arrived at the Ozar-Hatorah school in Toulouse.  Another older student was wounded. The R.A.I.D., the French version of a SWAT police unit, killed him after a 32-hour siege.   

A Plot Inspired and Driven by Al-Qaeda?

Merah’s modus operandi was chillingly efficient and savagely barbaric.  The murderer approached his victims on a scooter, clad in black, and wearing a helmet. He opened fire on his victims at point blank range with a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol, aiming precisely at their upper bodies and heads.  There was no escaping his wrath.  “I can still see the flames coming out of the barrel.  He killed the last soldier like an animal,” reported an employee of the newspaper stand nearby the automated teller where Merah shot the three soldiers.

The killer was a 24 year-old French citizen of Muslim faith.  During conversations with the police negotiator publicized by Prosecutor Michel Molins, Mehra claimed to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda and trained by Al-Qaeda in Waziristan.  He further indicated that he had received guidelines from Al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan to conduct terrorist attacks in France and warned that his actions were part of a larger campaign.  He also said that he had planned to continue his killing spree by killing more police officers and soldiers.  According to Michel Molins, he had already identified the individuals to be killed.  Organizational links to Al-Qaeda have yet to be proven, but intelligence officials are convinced that Merah radicalized himself watching al-Qaeda video propaganda on the Internet.    

In a telephone call to France 24 two hours before the police laid siege to his apartment, Merah claimed responsibility for all three attacks.  He said he carried out the attacks against the soldiers to protest the French law forbidding the wearing of the head-to-toe veil known as burqa and to protest French intervention in Afghanistan.  He chose to target soldiers because they are a symbol of the State, but chose the individuals randomly.  He chose to attack Jewish children supposedly to avenge his “Palestinian brothers and sisters.”  Here again, he chose Jewish targets as a symbol of Israel but targeted the individuals randomly.

New Challenges for French Counter-Terrorism

These attacks and the failure to prevent them pose the series of new unexpected challenges to the French government. 

  • The modus operandi is strikingly different from past Salafist-Jihadist attacks in France.  Handgun attacks are more reminiscent of radical Marxist Palestinian factions such as Abu Nidal or Corsican or Basque terrorist attacks.   Up until a few weeks ago, Salafist-Jihadists’ preferred mode of action consisted of planting bombs in the public square.  Merah’s M.O. is consistent with Abu Musab al Suri’s recommendation to engage in small-scale independent acts of anti-Western terror.  Moreover, Salafist-Jihadist attacks have largely been mass attacks geared at killing as many as possible regardless of their individual status in society.  Merah’s attacks are different.  He carefully chose his victims in accordance with Al-Qaeda’s definition of its enmity: French soldiers representing the crusaders who occupy Islamic lands, and Jews who represent the state of Israel.  In the past, mass attacks that killed indiscriminately made it easier for the government to mobilize all forces of society against the terrorism, as everyone could easily identify with the victimized bystander.  Selected targets might complicate the government’s task as ordinary people not belonging to the categories targeted (the vast majority of people) might feel less connected to or concerned with such attacks. 
  • According to French authorities, Mohammed Mehra is a loner, the product of an “atypical Salafist self-radicalization,” without connection to any “jihadist organization structure known to the services.”  If accurate, this is a major departure from past attacks where terrorists were part of a logistical cell affiliated to a larger movement, principally the GIA (Algerian Armed Islamic Group) that provided the resources and expertise necessary to successfully conduct the planned attacks.  The absence of a logistical cell threw the surveillance of the DRCI off as they rated Merah at low-risk of carrying out attacks because they saw no cell-related activity.  Whether there were no cells, or the cells went unidentified for too long remains to be seen.   Either way, it indicates that the painstaking work of monitoring and preventing new attacks will need to be adapted. The government is bound to propose new legislation to close what has appeared as loopholes in the current legislation.
  • Last, Merah behaved like a ‘serial killer.’  In the past, single terrorists carried out one operation, but Merah successfully conducted three attacks and told the R.A.I.D negotiator that he was planning on attacking more soldiers and police officers on the morning the police laid siege to his apartment.  Criminologists noted that Merah displayed a deeply narcissistic motivation and a pathological desire to eliminate all those whom, he believes, do not deserve to live; traits consistent with serial killers.  He acted with the cold determination and the violent savagery of serial killers.  In Monday’s attack, he pursued the frightened daughter of the school’s principal into the schoolyard as she was seeking refuge into the building, to shoot her to death. Moreover, he expressed no regrets for the deaths he caused.  Prosecutor François Molins said: “He expressed no regrets.  He only regretted not having killed more victims.  On the contrary, he boasted that he brought France down to its knees.” The confluence of terroristic and criminal motivations and tactics present new challenges for both the French government and French society.  Among those challenges: how does the government detect those individuals before they spur into action? How does society cope with an extended terroristic shooting spree? What is the impact on local socio-economic life if a shooting spree causes of local lock-down?  

Political Controversy and Announced Reforms

However unusual the circumstances of the attacks and the profile of Mohammed Merah, the failure to prevent him and the length of time (eight days) it took to identify and neutralize him prompted unusually vocal criticisms of the Intelligence Services and calls for reforms.

Amidst a tough presidential campaign, opposition leaders openly wondered whether the Intelligence Directorate (DCRI) did all that was necessary in a timely manner.The fact that Merah was identified as a potential suspect after the first attack but left to his own device until after the murderous spree at the Ozar hatorah school eight days later remains a key point of criticism.François Hollande, the candidate for the Socialist Party, suggested that a full review of all counter-terrorism laws and structures might be in order.Subsequently, the socialist group in the Senate requested that the chiefs from the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (Erard de Corbin de Mangoux) and from the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (Bernard Squarcini) appear before a Senate panel.Meanwhile, the extreme-right candidate Marine Le Pen lambasted the government for being too soft on radical Islamists.

In response to the political firestorm, the government has adopted a four-prong approach.First, it publicly defended the State’s services, praising the actions of both the DCRI and the police.Second, the government quelled the Socialist request for a hearing of the two Intelligence chief, accusing the Socialist Party of playing politics ahead of the elections.Third, the government announced a new anti-terrorism legislation aimed at criminalizing radical Islamist Internet surfing and as well as traveling to insurrectionary countries.  A government spokesman announced a draft law for the end of April.  Lastly, the government cracked down on presumed radical Islamist groups in two nationwide operations. So far, 13 militants are under arrest.  These operations indicate that the government may be attempting to neutralize not only groups that act violently, but also those who advocate the use of violence. 

It is likely that serious internal reassessment of how to detect radicalized individuals is already underway as the French government does not want a repeat of the Merah episode.More serious legislative initiative and/or organizational reorganization will probably have to wait after the Presidential Elections in May 2012.