Small Wars Journal

military reform

"It's time for a third special operations revolution"

Sat, 08/01/2020 - 8:15am

"Its time for a third special operations revolution"

Military Times · by Dave Maxwell · August 01, 2020

COL(r) David Maxwell (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) discusses pivotal milestones in the creation of the US special operations forces while proposing a three part reorganization of that community to meet both the demands of Congress and those of the modern battlefield.

What Caesar Told His Centurions: Lessons of Classical Leadership and Discipline for a Post-modern Military

Wed, 01/02/2013 - 5:30am

Roman discipline was built upon a belief in the virtues of austerity and frugality, the dignity of labor and an acceptance of hardship – but tempered by a willingness to acknowledge the basic humanity of soldiers and not to castigate them for sins they committed away from the battlefield.

About the Author(s)

The Generals... Readable but Flawed?

Fri, 11/30/2012 - 5:19pm

Gian Gentile provides an intelligent dissection of Tom Ricks' The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today at the New York Journal of Booksdeeming it "highly readable but flawed."

Tom Ricks’s new book The Generals regresses from Keegan and takes us back to a less complicated form of military storytelling in which wars’ outcomes were determined solely by the performance of army commanders.

The main argument to the book is simple: Relieve American army generals in war for poor performance and victory will be more attainable.

Read it here.

Why Bringing Back the Draft Makes No Sense

Fri, 07/20/2012 - 5:51am

When retired Army General Stanley McChrystal commented that he believes it’s time to “consider a draft” at the Aspen Ideas festival, he sparked a conversation in the media on the merits of the draft and why it would be good for our military and America. The argument to bring back the draft usually revolves around three key issues: 1) a conscripted military would be more representative of the United States population (and the inherent accusation that it currently does not), 2) the burden of war has unfairly fallen squarely on the shoulders of the all-volunteer military, (the much vaunted “other” 1%) and 3) policy makers would be less willing to wage war if their sons and daughters stood to potentially serve.

While the intentions behind bringing back the draft are mostly good in nature, they are largely based on misconceptions about military service, the state of the all-volunteer military, and who actually serves. Considering there are so few people who serve in the armed forces, it is no surprise that these misconceptions exists. The problem with bringing back the draft is that it would not accomplish the noble goals of those who support its return.

The most important point in arguing against bringing back the draft is that we don’t need it. That is, the armed forces are currently having no problems with recruiting, and in most cases, are recruiting over 100% of their target goals. To bring back the draft, the military would have to do one of two things in order to make room for the conscripts: increase the size of the overall force or partition off a certain quota of positions to be made up of conscripts. Considering the current economic situation and the planned reductions in troop numbers, increasing the size of the overall force is a nonstarter. Given the military’s current recruiting success, partitioning off “slots” for draftees could work only by turning away otherwise qualified recruits. Then, there would still only be a tiny portion of the armed forces that were draftees in a mostly all-volunteer force.

Going further, only about 30% of military aged youth (ages 17-24) are fit to serve. Obesity, physical and mental conditions, drugs, and criminal issues have disqualified the majority of the potential pool for a draft. If we were to bring back the draft, only the “fit” 30% would be eligible for service so long as we maintain the current ascension standards, resulting in a strange “discrimination of the fittest.” Based solely on service eligibility, a conscripted military of only the “fittest 30%” would hardly be representative of America.

The military preys on poor minorities. To tackle some of the assumptions introduced earlier, the ranks of the military are not predominantly filled by the country’s poor minorities. No matter how often this myth is debunked, it continues to persist.  Rather, with the exception of gender, the armed forces are fairly representative of the country. Instituting the draft might bring the demographic percentages closer to true proportionality with the general population if that pool of “fit” Americans eligible for serve is also directly proportional with the general population, which it is most likely not.

The Other 1%. It is true that the burden of fighting the war in Iraq and Afghanistan has been largely shouldered by the all-volunteer military, the “other 1%” of Americans who chose to serve in the military during a time of war.  (With a total end strength of about 1.5 million (active), the military makes up less than .5% of the American population.) Except those soldiers who were “stop-lossed” earlier in the wars, deploying multiple times is often a choice made by the professional soldier.  A draft would do nothing to limit the burden of war on the individual. The military does not deploy soldiers as individuals, but as a part of a unit. Units rotate in and out of theater, taking time to reset, train, and prepare to deploy again. During this period, individual soldiers rotate to different units who may be on different deployment schedules, resulting in a soldier who may not have had as much time at home as would be preferred. The only way a draft would lessen the burden on the individual is if the draft were designed to replace these soldiers, and force them to “sit out” a deployment or to get out of the military altogether, which I don’t think is the intent of proponents of the draft.

The Hunger Games. It makes sense to believe that if we had a draft, policy makers would be less likely to engage in risky military adventurism because their own sons and daughters might be called to serve. However, the raw numbers suggest that the probability of this happening is so infinitesimally small that it would be insignificant, except for symbolic value, perhaps.

Instituting the draft in one of the aforementioned ways (increasing the size of the military or partitioning off draft “slots”) would not spread the burden of service uniformly over the population because of the few who are eligible to serve. It would not lessen the burden of service for the individual or make the armed forces more representative of the general population, and it would likely have only a marginal effect on policy makers’ decision making because the chances of their sons or daughters being drafted in a shrinking military filled with volunteers is so miniscule.

The Civlian-Military Divide. Bringing back the draft is often raised as a way to lessen the civilian-military divide. That is, the socio-cultural dissonance felt by members of the military and the civilian population at large (Not to be confused with that “other” civil-military divide, which is about civilian control of the military and policy making). This divide has been identified by prominent members of the military as well as politicians as a growing problem facing the republic. Essentially, members of the military feel that the general public does not fully understand and appreciate the sacrifice of military service. There is also a feeling that the military is at war, but the rest of the nation is oblivious to that and not doing their share. In fairness, no one has identified what a harmonious civilian-military relationship would look like. My guess is that it is a fantasized version of what American life might have been like during World War II, where the citizenry was mobilized behind the war effort.

Addressing the civilian-military divide is important, but forcing a draft onto a military that does not need it will not close the divide. The numbers just don’t add up. Even if the entire volunteer military was abolished and “restarted” with all draftees, that force would still represent less than .5% of the population. And that .5% would come from the small portion of society that is fit for military service.

Essentially, the idea of a draft is more appealing than the reality. It is inspiring to think of a truly democratic fighting force that consists of exact proportions of the American population who are bonded together through training, shared sacrifice, and military service. If this were possible to achieve, than it might be worth examining. The reality is that bringing back a draft would do little to achieve any of the goals of those who argue for its return.






We Don't Reward Top Performers - And It's Costing Us

Tue, 02/14/2012 - 10:14pm

Marine officer Aaron MacLean at WaPo bemoans the military's lack of talent management (via @Doctrine_Man).  Many readers may disagree with the below comparison, but I challenge them to compare and contrast the mediocre beneficiaries of the military welfare/jobs program who use the lock-step promotion metric to justify their existence and satiate imaginations of grandeur with truly exceptional performers.  For those crying "experience," I have news for you: top performers with the right assignments can absorb very quickly what most don't learn in 20 years.

Imagine you are the CEO of a major American corporation. One of your executives, who is responsible for operations in, say, Kansas, is a phenom. ... If this wunderkind is so good in Kansas, it stands to reason that he could provide the same profitable results for your shareholders on a larger scale. Based on these considerations, you decide to make him manager of all Midwestern operations.

Now imagine that you are not a CEO, but a senior leader in the United States armed forces. Faced with a comparable situation—instead of a statewide manager, our hotshot is now an infantry company commander achieving remarkable success in Afghanistan—your options are far more limited. In fact, you are prohibited by both policy and regulation from exercising anything near the flexibility available to your private sector counterpart. This is the case despite the fact that your firm’s wages are uncompetitive compared to what top performers could earn elsewhere, and that you demand sacrifices of your leaders and especially of their families far in excess. Most importantly of all, your hands are tied despite the fact your charge is not just to produce the best profit for your shareholders, but to win a war for your country.