Small Wars Journal

Zapad 2017

Fri, 09/15/2017 - 12:37pm

Zapad 2017

David Murphy

The last 24 hours have seen the start of this year’s Zapad manoeuvres: the joint exercises between the Russian forces and the army of Belarus, which also involves Russian forces stationed in the Kaliningrad Oblast. In recent months, the build-up has created considerable concern from Western powers and observers. Despite the fact that foreign observers have been invited, NATO and in particular the Baltic States are watching the exercises closely. There have been further protests in Ukraine and there is wider concern about fly-overs by Russian aircraft into Latvian, Lithuanian or Ukrainian airspace. In recent weeks, there has been a considerable increase of such incursions into the airspace of the Baltic states, perhaps justifying the gradual increase in NATO’s Baltic air policing programme.

Concerns have also been voiced that Russian troops might remain in situ in Belarus after the exercises end, increasing Russian potential for operations against the Baltic states. Despite such concerns, the numbers involved, at least officially, are rather low. The exercises will involve less than 13,000 troops, 10 ships, 140 tanks and other heavy weapons elements. Keeping the troop numbers at this level avoids the requirement to invite a large observer force, which would have been triggered under the terms of Article 47.4 of the OSCE’s Vienna Document, of which Russia is a signatory. Compared to the Lake Baikal exercises of 2013, which involved over 160,000 troops and 5,000 tanks, this year’s Zapad exercises could be seen as a rather modest affair.

However, estimates of the actual troops involved vary widely. Some intelligence sources have stated that the actual Russian forces involved could number around 100,000. Ukraine has claimed that up to 250,000 troops are involved. The best intelligence estimate, based on train movements and other LOGS activity, would suggest somewhere between 60,000-70,000. Mandatory reporting under the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty also gives indications of the number of troops deployed and also provides some details of actual formations. Inconsistencies remain, especially with respect to the troops stationed on the border but in Russian territory and hence not subject to mandatory reporting. In any event, it would seem certain that the forces used in this exercise are indeed greater than the stated 13,000 and veer closer to 70,000 at least.

The scenario that will be played out during Zapad envisages an attack on Belarus by three fictional rogue states. Ironically, considering Russian activity in Ukraine, this attack will involve incursions by unidentified troops and the involvement of unattributed militias. The Russian air and naval elements will control air and sea corridors while also isolating the belligerent states and interdicting their air and land operations. Russian sources have continuously emphasised the “purely defensive” nature of the exercise.

The last few years have seen the Russian military remerge from a phase of reorganisation and reinvestment under the Putin administration. Its operations in Syria and Ukraine have improved Russian operational potential while also serving to greatly improve morale among Russian forces. Western observers have viewed this re-emergence of Russian potential with some concern. The most recent study to emerge from the Royal United Services Institute (Igor Sutyagin and Justin Bronk, Russia’s new ground forces: capabilities, limitations and implications for international security, 2017) has identified an increasing Russian tendency to prepare for high-tempo operations against NATO.

In light of such activity, NATO and Western states have comforted themselves with the argument that their forces and equipment is qualitatively superior. This may be true but the disparity in numbers is disheartening. To take just one example, a recent report suggests that the Russians have 27 combat air squadrons deployed in their “Western Military District”, compared to 19 squadrons available to NATO countries in the same theatre (Richard Sokolsky, “The new NATO-Russia military imbalance: implications for European security”, Task force White Paper, March 2017). One can only hope that better equipment, training and command & control can deliver an advantage for NATO and Baltic forces in any actual confrontation but, to paraphrase the Stalin quote, quantity has a quality of its own.

Another concern is Russia’s concept of hybrid operations. For Western powers, the focus for hybrid operations is largely on the battlefield. But, as we have seen in recent years, the Russian concept (Gibridnaya Voyna) is much broader, encompassing everything from cyber-attacks, political compromise operations, attacks on energy and other resources, financial interference and the use of unattributed forces on the ground. In a cultural sense, the West needs to re-evaluate its understanding of Russian hybrid operations. The current practice to “mirror image” our own conceptions to match Russian concepts could lead to a possible mismatch in operational capabilities.

In the small wars context, how might Russian SF operators be deployed in any escalating situation? In the late 19th century, the Russians began developing the concept of the “forward detachment” (peredevoy otryad); a force that would penetrate into the enemy’s depth to seize specific objectives, carry out reconnaissance or engage in raiding and disruption. This concept was well-developed during WW2, with the Russians deploying paratroopers and activating partisans in German rear areas as part of larger offensives. During the Cold War, the possible deployment of airborne and Spetsnaz troops within larger offensive operations remained a concern for NATO forces. In recent years, we have seen Russia’s willingness to deploy un-badged, unattributed, troops as part of their operations in Ukraine. Ironically, Zapad 2017 incorporates the possibility of an enemy using such troops and tactics in large-scale incursions into Belarus. It will be interesting to see if Western observers have an opportunity to assess Russian countermeasures for such activity. It is known that at least one reconnaissance battalion (136th Detached Guards Reconnaissance Battalion) is involved in the exercises and the involvement of airborne units has been predicted. In the context of Zapad, such units could be tasked with role-playing the forces of incursion and/or the Russian reaction to same.

What seems certain is that, for NATO SF operators trained in “small wars” type operations, the interdiction and disruption of potential attacks of this type of incursion or deep deployment must be factored into wider preparations to counter any larger Russian operation. Alongside preparing for large-scale Russian ground and air incursions, with possible naval activity, NATO needs to deploy more SF units that have been specifically trained to counter the deployment of Russian airborne, Spetsnaz and “little green men” as part of its potential countermeasures.

About the Author(s)

Dr Murphy is a graduate of University College, Dublin (BA, MLitt) and Trinity College, Dublin (PhD). He has taught at both of these institutions, teaching electives on European and Irish history as well as military history and the history of polar exploration. Between 1997 and 2005 he was a major contributor to the Royal Irish Academy’s Dictionary of Irish Biography, writing almost 400 biographical entries. During this period working for the Royal Irish Academy, he was also seconded to the Irish Manuscripts Commission. In 2004 he became the first Irish scholar to be awarded a fellowship to the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. He is a member of various societies including the T.E. Lawrence Society and the Ormonde Military History Society. Since 2008, he has acted as a reader for academic publishers, including Four Courts Press, Palgrave-MacMillan, Yale UK and Liverpool University Press. He is a member of the Royal United Services Institute and is an external examiner for Department of Defence Studies, King's College, London. See his personal website here.


Some points to consider RE: Zapad 2017

1. Russia is enhancing its conventional capabilities, but it relies upon nuclear deterrence at present, as it has since the mid-1990s. It is reasonable to expect Russia to work on the major conventional gap between it and NATO.

2. It is also reasonable to expect Russia to be able to achieve local superiority against NATO forces in the Baltics, albeit to a much lesser degree than say the GSFG/NVA achieved against West Berlin.

3. What none of the reporting, including RAND’s war-gaming, seems to account for, is the crucial role that out-of-theater assets would play in responding to a Russian attack against NATO’s eastern flank. Specifically, I am referring to U.S. strategic bombers (stealth and stand-off), U.S., French and British SSNs, and U.S. SSGNs. Even assuming 60% of the U.S. assets are turned toward the Asia-Pacific and assuming normal readiness rates, these assets should be able to put an overwhelming amount of ordnance on target, destroying Russian SRBMs and SAMs.

4. Every one of Putin’s wars has relied overwhelmingly upon local auxiliaries to do the brunt of the killing and dying. In both Georgia and Ukraine, probably less than 10,000 Russian troops were in combat at any one time, despite reserve pools many times their number.

5. The performance of the Russian Air Force leaves something to be desired, which is precisely why Russian ground force units are equipped to fight without CAS. The RuAF’s precision-strike capabilities are closer to Arc Light than they are to Desert Storm, and even Georgian air defenses created quite a problem in 2008.

6. Throughout the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact both fielded Intelligence/SOF units that would operate behind enemy lines during a war, conducting assassination, sabotage and reconnaissance activities. These asymmetrical units are formed precisely because one side is conventionally overmatched by another e.g. the British from 1939-1942 (SOE), NATO from 1949-1981 (Gladio, Berlin Brigade Det-A) and now Russia. These sorts of forces would be best suited to the Baltic Republics.

7. I would caution against codifying ad hoc Russian tactics borne out of strategic opportunism into doctrine. When NATO is fully prepared for “little green men” to appear in towns and cities, that is when regular Russian armor will burst out of the woods.

8. I would also caution against confusing Georgia and Ukraine with NATO. Putin seems to be well aware of the difference, and if any neighbors are in his sights, they are likely to be Belarus and Kazakhstan. If Putin felt confident about tackling NATO, why would he have forestalled it in Georgia and Ukraine to begin with?

Modified and added to slightly from my initial offering:

If one looks closely, MG Linder, et al., in their "The Battlefield of Tomorrow Fought Today: Winning in the Human Domain" (SWJ link provided below), appear to provide us with an overall context within which to properly view both (a) "their" Zapad 2017 exercise and (b) "our" need for NATO SF operators, etc.

In this regard, consider the following from the above-referenced MG Linder, et al., article:


... Gone were the days of great power politics, replaced by waves of non-state terrorist threats, popular revolutions, and the rise of social media to redefine identities and interests the world over, or so we were led to believe.

Instead, we have seen the resurgence of great power rivalries across the political, economic, and social arenas. ...


(Note here that, whereas in the first quoted paragraph above, the post-Old Cold War world might have been viewed more in Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" terms, in the second quoted paragraph above, we are told, by MG Linder, et. al., that, instead, something like a New Cold War has become manifest -- one which, much like the Old Cold War, involves "great power rivalries across the political, economic, and social arenas.")

Next, note how MG Linder, and his co-authors, appear to indicate that, in this New Cold War, the roles -- of ourselves, and the Russians/the Chinese, etc., -- these appear to have changed/to have been, in fact, reversed:


Differing from the previous Tsarist regional empire and the Soviet globalist one, the new Russian foreign policy has a more pragmatic goal. It aims to build different types of buffer zones against NATO encroachment to the West and U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Central Asia.


(Note here that MG Linder, et al., appear to show Russia [etc.?] pursuing more of a defensive strategy [dare we say "containment" and/or "roll back?"]; this, vis-a-vis the threat posed by the U.S./the West's now [more-Soviet-like?] "globalist"/"expansionist" ambitions.)

MG Linder, et. al, thus, now appearing to have -- via their such explanations -- set the stage for our understanding of the "conflict environment" of our present times? (To wit: a New/Reverse Cold War?)

In this regard (the New/Reverse Cold War), how are we to see such things as:

a. "Their" Zapad 2017 exercises? (In terms of, for example, "their" -- consistent with "containment" -- version of "our" old REFORGER?) And, indeed,

b. "Our" need for NATO SF operators -- trained in "small" (or indeed other) "wars?" (In terms of "our" -- consistent with "expansion" -- facilitating revolutionaries/fomenting revolution;" in this case, more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines?)

Or, in something of an alternative (but sticking here with the overall New/Reverse Cold War context -- after all, MG Linder, and his co-authors above, did not stuff Henry Kissinger no less into their ruck sacks, hump him out all the way to the academic/the strategic field and prominently display him before us for nothing, yes?], might we see Zapad 2017, and our need for NATO SF operators, more in the light offered by this, somewhat different ("not in my back yard!"), Old Cold War similarity/comparison:


Employed as part of a broader strategy, what hybrid warfare did was allow the United States to carry out open-ended competition and signal certain confidence that the value of protecting the U.S. sphere of interest was greater than any opponent’s interest in upsetting it. After all, it would have served little purpose to test the escalation dominance the United States enjoyed in the hemisphere, say by threatening direct action against Cuba or rattling nuclear sabers. Instead, the method was a low-fear, low-cost, economy-of-force way to manage superpower confrontation that remained well below the threshold that might have provoked a more energetic response.


(Note here, however, that, unlike now, back then, "they" were doing "expansion" and "we" were doing "containment" and "roll back.")