Small Wars Journal

Processing Leader Development

Sat, 09/03/2016 - 9:44am

Processing Leader Development

Mathew Fukuzawa


Steve Jobs.  While some remember him as a creative genius unafraid to take risks, others remember him as a caustic, inexorable miser.  Adam Lashinsky described an interaction between Jobs and the MobileMe product team:

In the summer of 2008, when Apple launched the first version of its iPhone that worked on third-generation mobile networks, it also debuted MobileMe, an e-mail system that was supposed to provide the seamless synchronization features that corporate users love about their BlackBerry smartphones.  MobileMe was a dud.  Users complained about lost e-mails, and syncing was spotty at best.  Steve Jobs doesn’t tolerate duds.  Shortly after the launch event, he summoned the MobileMe team…Jobs walked in, clad in his trademark black mock turtleneck and blue jeans, clasped his hands together, and asked a simple question:  ‘Can anyone tell me what MobileMe is supposed to do?’  Having received a satisfactory answer, he continued, ‘So why the f--- doesn’t it do that?’  For the next half-hour Jobs berated the group.  ‘You’ve tarnished Apple’s reputation.  You should hate each other for having let each other down.  Mossberg, our friend, is no longer writing good things about us.’  On the spot, Jobs named a new executive to run the group.1

Jobs will always be attached to Apple, a company whose products we adore.  For Jobs, though, great products were not born from regulated, industry driven processes, but from the content of the product.  Jobs was deeply concerned with a product’s ability to revolutionize society or change a way of life and not necessarily with the process to create it.  In a 1996 interview he stated, “That’s what makes great products—it’s not process it’s content.”2  Fortunately, Steve Jobs did not write leader development doctrine for the Army.  The Army appreciates the resultant product of leader development, but it also values the process involved to create the product.  While many of the Army’s great leaders have blossomed on the battlefield without systematic development, there are doctrinal references that define leader development processes to enable holistic growth.  This article argues that failure to follow a process in the operational domain leads to failures in leader development.

Product or Process?

The general question of whether the process or the end product is more important is typically answered by the situation and its context.  Some would argue that the product is always the most important aspect of any system.  For example, a contractor submitting a bid for a large defense contract cares more about his product being accepted over the competition; a ground commander cares more about the effects on target (product) from ordnance (it is only in the case of accidents that we delve into the process post hoc).  Even in the sports world, athletes are fond of saying that only the win matters. 

On the contrary, there are other situations where the process retains more value than the product.  In many of the core math courses taught by the Department of Mathematical Sciences at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, assessments typically give more weight to the problem solving process than the final solution.  Thus, USMA values the ability to think through a problem more so than the answer because of the nature of the current threat setting facing our future junior officers—an incredibly variable, complex environment presenting ill-defined problems with no correct solution.  In the discipline of writing, many authors state that their writing process is the important step in the creation of the final book, article, etc.  Returning to the sports world, people synonymize Alabama football with championships.  However, the recruiting and coaching processes used by Bear Bryant and Nick Saban always accompany this recognition.  In military planning, the troop leading procedures (TLP) military decision-making process (MDMP), and Army Design Methodology (ADM) are processes designed to help military leaders solve problems. 

We value these processes because they engender critical thinking and sound judgment to develop situational understanding.  Even if the final product—course of action (COA)—is flawed, the COA is lifeless without the critical, creative, and analytical thinking that occur in its creation.    In order to grasp this problem with respect to leader development within the operational domain, we need to understand the relevant domains and definitions provided by doctrine.


Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, dated August 2012, defines leader development as a “continuous and progressive process, spanning a leader’s entire career.  Leader development comprises training, education, and experience gained in schools, while assigned to organizations, and through the individual’s own program of self-development.”3  In yet another manner, the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) from 2013 reads, “Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, and progressive process—founded in Army values—that grows Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent, committed professional leaders of character.”4  Field Manual (FM) 6-22, dated June 2015, reads, “Leader development is fundamental to our Army—leader development is the deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process—founded in Army values—that grows Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action.”5  Despite subtle differences in these definitions, the one constant across them all is the word process.  However, we do not give enough justice to this meaning.

To illustrate the idea of a continuous process, the Army uses a leader development model visualized in Figure 1.  Development occurs in three domains:  operational, institutional, and self.  This figure is somewhat misleading, however, because it implies that development occurs with equal weight across the three domains.  The majority of leader development occurs in the operational domain, and even Army doctrine recognizes the imbalance due to time.6

Figure: The Army Leader Development Model.7

Process in the Operational Domain

While doctrine states that the leader development process is continuous, we can consider each operational assignment as a sub-process to the overall body of work that is one’s career in the military.  At the end of each one of these sub-processes, leaders are assessed on their skills and abilities through various reports.  What does a leader development process look like in an operational assignment?  While there is no one correct, cookie-cutter answer to that question, at a minimum the process should be methodical and orderly.

The operational domain has in large part suffered from the absence of a systematic process since the early 2000s.  Granted, after more than 10 years of combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, some would argue that the Army needed to focus on the mission rather than formal leader development.  Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), while it provided some predictability with scheduling, it also affected the ability to plan for leader development activities.  However, the pace of operations is not predicted to slow down in the near future.  With the rise of globalization through traditional state actors as well as non-state actors and transnational terrorist organizations, the number of threats to U.S. interests has increased.8  Hence, we cannot continue to use deployments as an excuse for cutting corners in leader development.

During the last 15 years, on-the-job training (OJT) has been the primary means by which leaders experience development.  Yes, OJT is a process in itself and has contributed immensely to the growth and development of many of our Iraq-Afghanistan era leaders.  However, it is not systematic enough to ensure sustained continual development; over reliance on OJT leads to failures in leader development.  The transition to a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy from high intensity conflict showed that OJT was not the best method for learning.  Leaders at the lowest level were told by their pre-Iraq superiors to “figure it out.”  Before long, we were making case studies of Abu Ghraib, the Kill Company, and Black Hearts.  Again, while we should not eliminate OJT, a refined focus on the systematic process of leader development should yield a more consistent product across the force.

Studies and Findings

A 2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) revealed the effects of prolonged combat on leader development.  Namely, 29% of leaders (Sergeant through Colonel) stated that unit and organizational leaders developed the leadership skills of subordinates to a great extent, while 61% said development was only to a moderate extent; 62% of leaders rated superiors as effective developers of subordinates, while the percentage rated as ineffective hovers around 20%; and only 29% of leaders stated their unit leader development programs had a significant impact on their development.9  Furthermore, many respondents rated peer learning and on-the-job training (OJT) as more impactful.10  OJT continues to be rated among the highest practices for impactful development.  The Sergeant First Class (SFC) and above population rated OJT (operational experience) better than 75% as having a great impact on leader development; Sergeant (SGT) and Staff Sergeant (SSG) are not far behind at 69%.11

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced the prevailing idea that OJT is highly beneficial to leader development, yet reliance on OJT has yielded inconsistent and variable results.  The counter argument here is that a profession does not place untrained individuals into a job.  Talent development and training are supposed to prepare an individual for the position, with subsequent development gained through continued training and experience.  Airline pilots do not learn how to fly an airliner by sitting behind the controls on day one.  Surgeons do not learn how to perform surgery without prior training.  Likewise, the military should not expect its leaders to achieve excellence in the operational domain without formal processes to ensure growth.

Counseling is another area where we fall short.  Also in the 2014 CASAL, 39% of leaders stated that formal and informal counseling had a small, little, or no positive impact.  Additionally, only half of the respondents believed that superiors provided performance counseling frequently enough.  Even worse, roughly 22% of respondents (Sergeant through Colonel) reported never receiving any informal or formal performance counseling.12  Granted, studies such as the CASAL tend to illuminate divides among the ranks when it comes to counseling.  For example, senior and junior officers disagree on the value and frequency of the term counseling, but nonetheless there are widely different perceptions within units about formal and informal development.

A January 2015 Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) report found many counseling deficiencies with respect to Army standards.  According to Army Regulation (AR) 623-3, “Initial counseling will be conducted within 30 days after the beginning of the rating period, and quarterly thereafter, for NCOs, WO1s, chief warrant officers two (CW2s), lieutenants (LTs) (includes first lieutenants (1LTs) and second lieutenants (2LTs)), and captains (CPTs).  Counseling for all other grades will be on an as-needed basis.”13  DAIG also stated that 82% of CG officers; 76% of warrant officers; 70% of senior NCOs; and 52% of junior NCOs did not receive performance counseling to standard.14  Many leaders did report that they received informal feedback more frequently than formal written performance counseling, but the study could not confirm which method was more effective.

Leader development programs are an additional tool often bypassed at the operational level.  The same DAIG report identified that at the battalion level, 76% of commanders stated that leader development events were regularly canceled due to last minute changes from higher headquarters.  At the company level, commanders shared similar thoughts—leader development events were the first to depart the training schedule due to multiple competing priorities.15  The feeling was similar with the NCOs, who echoed the notion that leader development events were often hijacked by collective training events.  Differences also existed in perception between field grade (FG) and CG officers.  Many FGs felt that the emphasis on leader development was appropriate; this was not necessarily the same feeling at CG level.  For CG officers, leader development was dependent on the quality of their commanders—“Commanders make or break leader development because if you get a good one [CDR] you get developed.”16


The aforementioned studies merely highlight the fact that we have not adhered to a systematic process for leader development in the last decade and a half.  On the surface, this is not necessarily a bad thing.  After all, it is a commander’s prerogative to design his or her leader development framework.  Counseling, OJT, and leader development programs are merely methods available to a commander; what works for one person might not work for another.  However, we must be mindful of establishing new norms where OJT is the keystone, counseling occurs when you receive an evaluation report, and leader development programs only exist in theory.  A 2008 Rand Corporation study concluded that the high variability of leader development programs was a function of a commander’s influence and attention to leader development.17  This variability contributes to a large range of knowledge, skill, and ability in leaders across the force.

A toxic environment is one example that shows how the absence of leader development processes leads to inconsistencies in the final product.  In general, toxic leadership is defined as a “lack of concern for the well-being of subordinates, a personality or interpersonal technique that negatively affects organizational climate, and a conviction by subordinates that the leader is motivated primarily by self-interest.”18  Obviously, an individual within a toxic climate is not going to be developed.  How prevalent is toxic leadership?  Reed and Olsen conducted a survey of Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students in 2009 to gather data about toxic leadership at the mid-grade officer level.

The Reed and Olsen survey reported that nearly 18% of respondents described their Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel supervisor as toxic; 61% considered seriously leaving the service due to supervisor mistreatment; and in general, the mid-grade officer was less likely to remain in service after experiencing toxic leadership.19  They go even further to suggest that many of the characteristically toxic behaviors go unchecked, which leads to tolerance and norm development.  Despite the startling figures, 76% of the population indicated that they were likely to remain in the military even after experiencing toxic leadership.20  Reed and Bullis identified this phenomenon at the senior leader level as an interpersonal callus;  clearly, it is slowly trickling down the ladder.21  In the case of toxic leadership, the absence of an orderly leader development process robs the individual of achieving maximum potential.  If the individual decides to remain in service, he or she is most likely behind peers that benefitted from a leader development program that conformed to the defined Army process.

Another point of emphasis is retention.  Wardynski et al. explain that for West Point classes in particular since the mid-1990s, retention past the initial commitment of five years is only slightly higher than 50%.22  The authors offer an explanation that high performing ROTC scholarship officers and West Point graduates are attractive to civilian employers.  Since the pre-commissioning process invests much time and effort on these individuals, employers gain access to pre-screened managerial talent that is less of a risk than a new and inexperienced civilian.23  We cannot simply connect all early departures to poor leader development, but it is rare to meet a stellar performer who left service because of ‘X’ yet gushed over his unit leader development program.  It begs the question of how many departing leaders would have remained in the military with improved leader development systems.  I am not immune to this criticism either.  For at least four Lieutenants who did not achieve their maximum potential under my command, I blame myself for not contributing more time and effort to their development.

Tim Kane’s longitudinal survey—published in 2012—of West Point classes dating back to 1989 tried to determine reasons for the officer retention problem.  In the survey, 45% of respondents believed that most of the best officers left the military early; 6% agreed that the military did a good job at retaining its best leaders.  Additionally, 46% of departed officers cited weak role models/commanders as a reason for their flight; 32% cited the need for better leadership opportunities; and most mentioned problems with talent management.24  While talent management is an issue for higher levels of the military, talent development is something that we can affect at the operational level.  Clearly, poorly planned, resourced, and executed talent development leaves leaders with two choices:  depart the military, or remain in service and contribute to the inconsistency of leader development.  Either outcome should be considered a failure since, as General Odierno stated, “our number one priority must remain the development of our competitive advantage—our leaders.”25

Areas for Improvement

With a change in mission as we prepare for globally integrated operations, the leader development process needs to change as well.  Within the operational domain, we can augment the valuable experience and training gained during the performance of duty with improvements in counseling, leader development programs, and mentoring.


The first hurdle that we must overcome is adhering to Army standards mentioned previously—that is, counseling needs to be regular.  Leaders are generally great at conducting initial counseling, whether formal or informal.  We are failing to follow up, though, and many of our subordinates lose trust not only in the system, but also in the leaders that they follow.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that formal counseling is no longer a norm, but an exception.  The DAIG report observed that, “Field grade officers and Army Civilians, who supervise others, set the tone for counseling within an organization when they counsel subordinates.”26  As FG organizational leaders, we are arguably the ones with the most influence on the people in the organization.  When we fail to set the example for leader development and counseling, we are sending the message that the process is an individual task—potential is thus limited to individual skill.  Perhaps formal counseling on an Army form 4856 is not the best tool for a particular organization, but an organization that is devoid of performance and growth feedback is one that clearly values the end product over the process.

When feedback is not regular, surprises often arise.  If the surprise appears at the end of a sub-process in the form of an evaluation report, this can be devastating news for an Army career.  Performance based evaluations, such as the officer evaluation report (OER) or NCOER, should not be a surprise to the rated leader.  When counseling and performance feedback occur regularly, this is not an issue.  Our junior officers are learning bad habits from senior officers with regard to counseling, such as the absence of performance feedback, the inflation of evaluation reports, or the lack of assessment skills.  NCOs cannot be blamed for following these habits perpetuated by officers.  Laszlo Bock, Vice President of People Operations at Google, proposes that developmental counseling should be kept separate from performance reviews.  “If the only time your employees hear feedback on their work is annual or semiannual performance reviews, they’ll begin to associate criticism with failure, which can hold them back.”27

Second, counseling needs to be effective.  The definition of effectiveness offered here includes establishing goals and a plan to achieve them; identifying strengths and weaknesses with plans to address them; and ways to prepare for positions of higher responsibility.  Of course, this also means that the feedback needs to be balanced.  After all, a leader who only provides negative feedback will likely not inspire improvement.  Regularity combined with efficacy should lead to higher performance and greater self-awareness, as well as a more consistent approach to the process.  There is no correct method for how to employ these components, but one suggestion is a portfolio.  In this portfolio, a subordinate maintains an individual development plan (IDP) that comprises the aforementioned minimum effectiveness measures; a professional and personal timeline of key events and dates for a 10-year period; previous evaluations; self-assessments; anything else the leader and subordinate deem necessary for the unit, branch, or functional area.  The Rand study, in particular, references a Corporate Leadership Council that ranked the creation of a leadership development plan as the second most important development method among corporate executives.28  This portfolio becomes a necessary and inspectable part of the counseling process, and contributes to the development of Army enterprise leaders.

Third, we need accountability measures to ensure regularity and effectiveness.  Counseling regularity used to be measured on the OER; it is still present on the NCOER.  However, the reports referenced within conclude that recording counseling dates is a robotic event that does not reflect reality.  Counseling should remain on evaluation reports, and the intermediate rater or reviewer can help to verify this.  The intermediate rater verifies by signature that not only did formal counseling occur between rater and rated individual, but that the rated individual conducted formal counseling with his or her subordinates.  The Command Inspection Program (CIP) is another system that can be used to monitor the counseling program.  Inspectors should report on counseling at all levels up to and including the unit commander.  A return of Sergeant’s Time would also help to ensure that we meet inspection guidelines by dedicating time to counseling.

Effectiveness can be measured through the Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) 360 tool, the Army’s primary self-development feedback program.  Subordinates provide feedback to the leader about the effectiveness of counseling with respect to their development.  Going one step further, this feedback would be part of a leader’s evaluation report.  Of course, this means that the MSAF 360 would need to be completed more frequently than once every three years.  At least in this regard, there would be incentive to provide regular, effective counseling because currently there is none.

Leader Development Programs

We have all experienced some form of leader development program, whether it be a commander’s brown bag lunch, tactical vignette, staff ride, reading program, or even our own small group discussions with subordinates.  However, as the aforementioned DAIG report uncovered, planned leader development events are typically not guaranteed.  Again, the same issue exists here with incentive; there is no incentive or accountability measure to ensure that leader development programs maintain a place on the calendar and actually achieve valuable outcomes.

The CASAL and Rand reports suggested that units and commanders should be free to decide the look and appearance of their leader development programs. 

“A different approach—one we believe is unlikely to be successful or beneficial—is to impose formal programs, new forms, or reporting requirements on unit commanders…We learned, as implied earlier, that required counseling is already treated as an administrative burden and completed in a perfunctory way by some raters.  Commanders would likely resist what they would perceive as additional burdens…”29

The answer is not in mandatory programs or reports, but assessment means are surely required.  Even if events are scheduled and executed, we need a mechanism to evaluate effectiveness.  How do we prevent the “check-the-block” mentality that merely provides bullets on an evaluation report? 

First, leader development programs are more effective at smaller levels.  An event for 30-40 leaders is generally not as effective as one for 5-10.  Undoubtedly, this will take time to employ, but it serves to differentiate those who truly care about leader development and those who pay it lip service.  You must know the audience in order to connect the event with your intended developmental outcomes.  A guest speaker for an audience of 300 may be a riveting talk, but events are more impactful when they are limited to a leader’s span of control.  One of the more memorable experiences from my time at the tactical level was a brigade Walk and Shoot, in which a battalion commander walked with a company commander during an echelon of fires exercise.  The battalion commander provided timely, non-threatening feedback that was much more effective than sitting in a PowerPoint classroom.  Two, subordinates and peers can help to evaluate the effectiveness of unit, leader development programs.  The MSAF 360 is one reporting mechanism that can be altered to include program effectiveness; ratings are then transferred to an OER or NCOER.  This would provide more differentiation on the evaluation system, which currently gives more weight to a leader’s placement into one of two bins—the top 49% or the bottom 51%.  The OER and NCOER reveal little information about the process; it is very much about the product.  Information about leader development implementation could serve to give more weight to the process—did leader development events occur and were they effective?

Opponents of greater transparency in evaluation reports would argue that too many hands in the cookie jar would muddy the waters.  However, contemporary companies have already implemented this idea.  At Google, performance reviews also consider anonymous peer evaluations, some of which include employees junior to the individual.  In this sense, the potential bias of a single manager is somewhat dampened by peers, providing a more objective view of performance.30  In the opposite direction, a junior also provides weigh-in on superior performance and potential (which would also help to identify toxic leadership).  Essentially, Bock believes that a manager’s opinion alone should not decide your career, and perhaps the Army’s evaluation system should consider this as well.  During a drawdown, one evaluation provided by one senior rater has career altering implications.  As Wenzel argues, “Evaluation reports alone are not sufficient for assessing performance or potential.  The Army must consider additional ways to evaluate leader potential and the potential of industry-standard assessment centers for selection and promotion…”31

There are other options for implementing effective leader development programs.  First, we should not assume that our plan is the only correct solution based off previous experience.  Instead, I advocate taking time for subordinate assessment, asking the team for input on their developmental needs, and then formulating a plan.  A reading program, for example, is rarely an effective event when blindly applied to all situations.  It may be effective for a certain small group of people in a low-stress environment, but not in others.  In addition, we can employ next man-up training (especially prior to deployment).  Theoretically, at some point the junior will fill the shoes of the senior.  Next man-up drills are a tool to prepare leaders for greater responsibility.  Allow the squad leader to plan and execute the platoon attack; allow the Lieutenant  to run the company training meeting; allow the assistant to take lead on MDMP for the warfighting function; or allow the operations officer to command and control the battalion operation.  These formal ideas can be supplemented by an informal option as well.


FM 6-22 describes mentorship as a voluntary activity that is best performed when it occurs outside of the chain of command.  Furthermore, it should be subordinate sought and subordinate driven.32  Thomas and Thomas highlight the fact that mentorship is confusing, not only in definition but in scope.33  Some would argue that a mentor could exist within the chain of command.  In fact, the Army proverb, “Teach, Coach, and Mentor” has implications for within a chain of command.  However, true mentorship occurs without bias of evaluation or fear of reprisal.  Whether or not this can occur within a chain of command remains to be seen, but it is a process that FG leaders can affect.  Personally, I appreciate the opportunity to seek advice and guidance from mentors outside of the chain of command.  They provide honest, insightful, and impartial counsel that a rater and senior rater cannot offer.

Mentorship is an invaluable effort that highlights the process of individual development and should not be overlooked.  This sounds like a great idea, but lack of time often sidetracks the mentoring process just like with formal leader development programs.  In the 2014 CASAL report, roughly half of the respondents stated that they did not have a mentor.34  We should not change the definition of mentoring in our manuals; however, everyone needs to be involved in the mentorship effort if it is to improve.  Subordinates need to seek out at least one mentor—ask questions, reflect on experiences, and seek advice.  Make this interaction a regular event—weekly, monthly, annually, etc.  Superiors also need to be more proactive in giving back to the profession, and this does not end with Active Duty Soldiers.  It includes Retirees, Guardsmen, Reservists, and Civilians as well. 

Mentorship is part of being a steward of the profession, and according to our ethic superiors have an obligation to develop the future leaders of the Army.  To codify this in regulation, however, might go against the spirit of mentorship.  Perhaps a voluntary effort could germinate in the institutional domain to link varying levels of PME.  Maybe the War College students could meet and find mentees in the CGSC classes; CGSC with the CCC; CCC with the initial entry courses; and likewise on the NCO side.  The only problem with this approach is that the absence of a previous relationship most likely will not provide any stake or incentive for participation.

If we were to pursue formal mentoring requirements, maybe the answer again lies with the OER and NCOER.  A simple yes or no about serving as a mentor on evaluation reports would differentiate those who were truly committed to the leader development process.  In some of the more technical fields, perhaps a mentor program could resonate with our Training with Industry (TWI) partners.  Regardless of how it happens, mentoring is a rewarding experience that highlights the continuous, deliberate, and progressive process of leader development.  Mentorship is an investment in the health of the future force and we should apply more effort to its undertaking.


By definition, leader development is a continuous and deliberate process that produces competent and committed leaders of character.  While the product is still of prime importance, current practice in the operational domain tends to diminish the significance of the process.  On-the-job training remains an effective tool of leader development, but we must be careful about relying solely on this technique.  New norms and procedures are forming that lead many to forget about the process.

Studies and reports provide convincing evidence that our system has gaps.  The gaps discussed here are related to failures in following a systematic approach to leader development.  A more orderly approach to the process will serve to provide consistency in the product, and will also help to prevent the rise of toxic leaders and the departure of high performers.

Efforts to better align leader development as a process lie in counseling, formal development programs, and mentoring.  Counseling needs to be performed regularly and it must be effective.  Leader development events need to be protected on the calendar and must also be impactful rather than mandatory.  Finally, mentoring is a straightforward, informal option that deserves attention by all leaders in the Army; it is something that we could introduce as a formal option as well.

Army doctrine states that leader development is an investment.  An investment in the financial sense is a choice to put money towards an objective.  If that objective is a comfortable retirement, then the investment and its strategy become necessary and paramount.  Analogously, we must hold leaders accountable for investing in leader development to secure a future force that is healthy and prepared to lead.  If we invest in the process of leader development, then the return—competent, committed leaders who will perpetuate the process—will take care of itself.

End Notes

1.  Adam Lashinsky, “How Apple works:  Inside the world’s biggest startup,” Fortune, May 9, 2011, accessed June 13, 2016,

2.  “Steve Jobs Interview – Great Products:  It’s Content, Not Process” (video), posted August 25, 2014, accessed May 28, 2016, .

3.  Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders (Washington, DC:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 10.

4.  U.S. Army, Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) 2013 (Washington, DC:  Department of the Army, 2013) 3, 202013Record.pdf, accessed May 2016.

5.  Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Leader Development (Washington, DC:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015), 11.

6.  ADRP 7-0, 10.

7.  Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 350-58, Army Leader Development Program (Washington, DC:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 6.

8.  U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept:  Win in a Complex World (Fort Eustis, VA:  TRADOC, 2014) 18-19,  accessed May 2016.

9.  Riley et al., 2014 Center For Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL):  Military Leader Findings (Fort Leavenworth, KS:  Center for Army Leadership, 2015) 73-75, CASAL Military Leader Findings Report.pdf  accessed May 2016.

10.  Ibid, 78.

11.  Ibid, 84.

12.  Ibid, 93-94.

13.  Army Regulation (AR) 623-3, Evaluation Reporting System (Washington, DC:  U.S. GPO, 2015), 14-15.

14.  Inspector General (IG), Army Leader Development Inspection 13 June 2014 – 5 December 2014 (Washington, DC:  DAIG, 2015), 26.

15.  Ibid, 6.

16.  Ibid, 6.

17.  Peter Schirmer et al., Leader Development in Army Units (Santa Monica, CA:  Rand Arroyo Center, 2008) 61,, accessed May 13, 2016.

18.  George Reed and Richard Olsen, “Toxic Leadership:  Part Deux,” Military Review November-December(2010):  58.

19.  Ibid, 61-62.

20.  Ibid, 61.

21.  George Reed and Craig Bullis, “The Impact of Destructive Leadership on Senior Military Officers and Civilian Employees,” Armed Forces & Society 36, no. 1 (October 2009):  16, accessed June 27, 2016,

22.  Casey Wardynski, David Lyle, and Michael Colarusso, Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success:  Retaining Talent, (Carlisle, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute, 2010):  23,, accessed July 17, 2016.

23.  Ibid, 53-54.

24.  Tim Kane, Bleeding Talent (New York, NY:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 217-234.

25.  Raymond Odierno, “Leader Development and Talent Management:  The Army Competitive Advantage,” Military Review July-August(2015):  9.

26.  IG, 25.

27.  Richard Feloni, “Google’s HR boss shares 10 secrets to running a company everyone wants to work for,” Business Insider, May 19, 2015, accessed May 14, 2016,

28.  Rand, 27.

29.  Rand, 63-64.

30.  Shana Lebowitz, “Google’s HR boss explains why he thinks managers should have as little power as possible,” Business Insider, January 21, 2016, accessed May 14, 2016,

31.  Frank Wenzel, “Developing Leaders,” Military Review July-August(2015):  38.

32.  FM 6-22, 57.

33.  Jim Thomas and Ted Thomas, “Mentoring, Coaching, and Counseling:  Toward a Common Understanding,” Military Review July-August(2015):  51-52.

34.  Riley, 97.

About the Author(s)

Major Mathew Fukuzawa, U.S. Army, is currently a FA-49 (ORSA) officer serving as an instructor in the Department of Mathematical Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point.  He holds a B.S. in Mathematics from Michigan State University and an M.S. in Applied Mathematics from the Naval Postgraduate School. During his career, MAJ Fukuzawa served with the 1st Battalion, 64th Armor as an infantry platoon leader during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and with the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry as a company commander during Operation Enduring Freedom.