Small Wars Journal

NATO Moves to Combat Russian Hybrid Warfare

NATO Moves to Combat Russian Hybrid Warfare

Jim Garamone – Voice of America

WARSAW, Poland -- Russia is disturbing the peace, and NATO countries must combat its hybrid strategy, the alliance’s supreme allied commander for Europe said here today.

Army Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, who also commands U.S. European Command, spoke to reporters covering the NATO Military Committee meeting here, alongside Marine Corps Gen. Joe Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Scaparrotti said Russia already is a competitor that operates in domains “particularly below the level of war,” the general said, but in an aggressive way, noting that the Russians use cyber activity, social media, disinformation campaigns and troop exercises to threaten and bully other countries. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its actions Eastern Ukraine show their determination to continue to intimidate neighboring countries.

Undermining Western Values, Governments

“[They are] operating in many countries of Europe in that way, with basically the common theme of undermining Western values and the credibility of Western governments, in my view,” Scaparrotti said.

Short of conflict, Russia sends money to organizations in Europe at both ends of the ideological spectrum, the general said. “Really, their view is -- I call it a destabilization campaign. That’s their strategy,” he added. “If they can destabilize these governments, if they can create enough questions, then that is to their benefit.”

The Russians’ doctrine looks to achieve their ends without conflict, Scaparrotti said. “They have the idea that ‘I don’t have to put a soldier there or fire a shot, but if I can undermine the government, then I’ve achieved my ends,’” he explained. “That is particularly true of the countries that are in the Eastern part of the alliance that are on their border.”

The Soviet Union subjugated those countries after World War II, and Russia sees those countries as areas where it should still have privileged influence, he said. “They want to keep those governments in the position that they could influence them, and this is a tactic for doing that.”

The environment surrounding t has changed, he noted. “They were ahead of us in terms of changing their posture with respect to NATO,” he said, and the Russians have maintained a purposeful military modernization program that they have maintained even as their economy strains.

“It took us some time in NATO to recognize that [Russia] is not our friend, not our partner right now, and we have to pay attention to what’s happening in our environment and how they are acting,” he said. “Of course 2014 was a real wake-up. Russia violated international law and norms, which I will tell you they continue to do in other ways.”

Scaparrotti said he has no doubt that Russia would repeat its actions in Crimea and Ukraine “if they saw the opportunity and they thought the benefits exceeded the costs.”

This strategy is called a hybrid war, he said, and NATO is coming to grips with the concept. “One of the things about hybrid war is defining it. What is it?” he added. “It’s a lot of things, and most of it is not in the military realm.”

Whole-of-Government Approach

Planners need to determine what the military can do as part of a counter-strategy and what other agencies, branches efforts can contribute, he said. “And then [you must decide] how should you work with them, because we can’t just work on this on our own,” he said. “This really does talk about the whole-of-government approach and bringing others into it and deciding what needs to be done.”

In each NATO nation that approach has got to be different, Scaparrotti said, because the nations themselves have different strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. They also must factor in what Russia’s interest or activity is.

“We are working in this realm with military capacity as well,” the general said. “We have special operations forces, and this is their business. They understand it. To the extent that they can identify hybrid activity, they can help our nations build their ability to identify and counter it.”

NATO can, for example, reinforce each nation’s capacity for understanding disinformation and how to counter it, he said, noting that these issues are among the Military Committee meeting’s topics..

The bottom line is that Russian leaders need to understand that a conflict with NATO is not what they want, Scaparrotti said. “We are 29 nations. We’re strong. I am confident of our ability to secure the sovereignty of our nations in NATO,” he said.

Readiness Critical to Deterrence

NATO readiness is crucial to the deterrent success of the alliance, and Scaparrotti now has the tools to work on this aspect. Readiness in NATO means the commander gets a specific capability, and that capability is available on a timeline that’s useful given the environment, he explained.

“Then, of course, [readiness] is a mindset, which is perhaps the most important thing that has changed,” he said. “It is changing now.”

The NATO summit held in Brussels in July gave Scaparrotti the authority and directive to deal with alliance readiness.

“We are back to establishing force where I, as the commander, now have the authority to require readiness of units on a specific timeline and the ability to check them to ensure they can actually do it,” he said. “This all comes together with our ability to move at speed to meet the environment to do what we need to do.”



The strategy is not hybrid war. So-called "HW" is a critical capability (ability to wage...) enabled by the critical requirements contained in unbounded policy and statecraft (means, methods and resources). These critical factors are oriented towards the end state of "containment" as you mentioned. Critical vulnerabilities are included in statecraft as national interests that can be targeted directly or indirectly. 

Addendum to my comment immediately below:

If we do not attack Russia's strategy ("containment") -- rather than simply attacking its methods ("hybrid warfare") employed in the service thereof -- this, for example, by "doubling down" on our efforts to advance our way of life, our way of governance, our values, etc., in Russia's backyard, etc.,

And if we, instead, "back down" from these exact such "strategy attacking" initiatives (as President Trumps appears to have already done?),

Then cannot we -- and indeed he (President Trump) -- be:

a.  Properly accused of "appeasement?" And be:

b.  Properly "tarred" with all the implications thereof? 

From our article above:


Undermining Western Values, Governments

“[They are] operating in many countries of Europe in that way, with basically the common theme of undermining Western values and the credibility of Western governments, in my view,” Scaparrotti said.


What would seem to be missing from this article, it would seem, is a discussion of (a) the strategy of Russia (et. al) and (b) the end to which this such strategy was being applied.  

Thus, in an attempt to rectify this matter, I make the effort found below: 

Question No. One:  What is the strategy within which these "undermining Western values," etc., efforts are being made by Russia today?    

Answer No. One:  The strategy is "containment" -- of U.S./Western attempts to advance our way of life, our way of governance and, yes, our "values" -- these, in Russia's backyard, in its sphere of influence and, indeed, inside Russia itself  (Efforts, thus, which clearly threaten the current Russian regime?) 

Question No. Two:  What is the "end" to which this such "containment" strategy is being applied -- against the U.S./the West -- by Russia today? 

Answer No. Two:  Much as the "containment" strategy of the U.S./the West, during the Old Cold War, sought to bring about the demise of the Soviet system and to, thereby, eliminate the threat -- posed to the U.S./the West -- by Soviet/communist expansion back then,   

Likewise (given that "turnabout" is certainly "fair play?") is the current "containment" strategy of Russia (et. al), in our Cold War 2.0 conflict of today, designed to bring about the demise of the U.S./Western system and to, thereby, eliminate the threat -- posed to Russia (et. al)  -- by the U.S./the West's expansionist efforts post-the Old Cold War.

Final Question -- which I pose to our readers --

If the proper move here is for the U.S./the West to attack Russia's strategy (to wit: "containment" of  U.S./Western efforts to advance our way of life, our way of governance, our "values," etc.) -- this, rather than simply attacking Russia's methods employed in the service of same (for example, "hybrid warfare"),

Then, if this is indeed the proper move for the U.S./the West today (we go after their strategy -- not their methods), then do we not "double down" on our attempts to advance our way of life, our way of governance, our "values," etc.? 

Herein, using such things as (a) "democracy promotion" as (b) our ICBMs in this endeavor?  (I think that it was Elliot Abrams that made this such "democracy promotion= ICBM weapon today" suggestion -- this, in response to Trump's opposite moves -- but I simply cannot find the quote right now.)