The TRADOC doctrine writers are busy revising FM 3-24 and hope to publish the new version in December of 2013. The rewrite, by all accounts, will continue to embrace the concept of placing American Army and Marine brigade combat teams into the fight against foreign insurgents in attempts to keep host nation governments in power. This essay will argue that this overseas COIN approach, codified in FM 3-24, has proven itself seriously flawed and must be fundamentally reconsidered. Whether we like it or not, our experience indicates that deploying U.S. combat units to preserve the power of a foreign government against domestic insurgents is a fool’s errand. War outcomes will most likely be unfavorable and our heavy combat casualties and enormous dollar expenditures will be unredeemed. Based on the evidence so far, there is little data that would give us confidence that U.S. forces, assuming the principle counterinsurgent role, can win an overseas COIN war and deliver the desired war aims. From a strategic perspective, therefore, the FM 3-24 hypothesis must be rejected as improbable, perhaps impossible. On the other hand, our experience shows that comparatively small levels of American security force assistance (SFA) can succeed in defeating overseas insurgencies and preserving allied governments consonant with our global strategic interests.
Our current doctrine offers the following relevant definitions:
Insurgency: The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 1-02)
Counterinsurgency: Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)
Security Force Assistance: The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22)
Host Country: A nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (JP 1-02)
From the perspective of U.S. forces battling insurgents overseas, the COIN/SFA dichotomy is not one of operational approach, tactics, or techniques, but of principal combatant. When U.S. forces conduct COIN, as described in FM 3-24, our combat forces provide the majority of the combat effort. To use the common military and political parlance, America is “in the lead.” During SFA, host country forces are “in the lead” and American forces in country provide only assistance—advising, logistics, training, planning, and intelligence. U.S. ground combat forces, meaning brigade combat teams, are not engaged in direct combat with insurgents and most likely not even deployed into the country at all.
Of course, the United States enters into counterinsurgencies with two principal war aims, to defeat the insurgents and assure the survival of the friendly government. The figure below summarizes our performance in achieving our war aims based on whether we limit ourselves to a supporting role or, alternatively, assume the role of the principal COIN combatant.
As the figure shows, America’s SFA missions have been mostly successful. After World War II, the U.S. Army formed U.S. military assistance commands in Greece (1945-9), South Korea (1946-53), and the Philippines (1945-55) to assist allied indigenous armed forces defeat communist insurgencies. In each of these instances our adviser teams and the support they provided proved sufficient to tip the balance in the favor of the friendly government. (North Korea conventionally attacked in 1950, after the ROK army, with American advisory and materiel assistance, had largely defeated the Communist insurgency in South Korea.) Decades later, smaller assistance programs supported host country governments in Central America, namely in Honduras and El Salvador, in their struggles to eliminate domestic and regional insurgents; both the Honduran and El Salvadorian campaigns (1980-92) ended victoriously, and as a bonus helped our successful clandestine effort to topple the Sandinista Nicaraguan government of Daniel Ortega. In the past decade, especially in the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., modest American support of the Colombian government’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy COIN strategy has greatly reduced the FARC (Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces) menace to both the government and the population. In all of these FID efforts, U.S. ground forces never conducted combat operations and never took the lead from the host nation military and police forces. Instead, the U.S. Army, in coordination with the larger interagency effort, provided the host country militaries with advisors, weapons and other material assistance, training, both in country and sometimes in the United States, and intelligence support. On rare occasions, the American military would assist with precision fires and special operations. The costs of these wars, measured in American soldiers and dollars, were strategically acceptable, often even minor-- typically a few hundred or fewer advisors and budgets measured in tens or hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Except for the Central American campaign in the 1980s, none of these SFA programs became politically divisive within America.
Not all of our SFA missions have succeeded. Despite two billion dollars and the best efforts of our thousand-man military advisor group, we were ultimately unable to save Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Chinese government from defeat at the hands of Mao Tse-tung’s Communists. Sensing that neither the U.S. military nor the American people had the stomach for a large commitment of American combat forces in that vast civil war, the Truman administration conceded defeat in the effort, opting to cut American losses. Not so in Vietnam two decades later, when our Military Assistance Command, Vietnam failed to create a South Vietnamese military that could both defeat the Viet Cong and defend against North Vietnamese aggression. However, rather than abandon our South Vietnam project, President Johnson decided to commit U.S. Army and Marine combat divisions to take the lead, a move that ultimately increased our losses. In both China and South Vietnam, the unpopularity, corruption, and incompetence of the “friendly” host country regimes no doubt played into the hands of the revolutionaries and undercut the American SFA efforts.
When the U.S. military is the principal COIN actor--when U.S. sovereignty has been the issue-- we have been uniformly successful in achieving our war aims. In our victories over the Indians, the Confederacy, and the Philippine insurrectos in our newly proclaimed Pacific territory, American forces have invariably found the combination of combat and civil –“all of government”—policies that would create, restore, or extend U.S. governmental rule and create our necessary monopoly on the legitimate use of force. An enlightened and powerful government can generally find the appropriate combination of “carrots” and “sticks” needed to assure its own sovereignty in its own land.
Unfortunately, we have yet to find a formula that allows U.S. military forces to take the lead role in a foreign counterinsurgency in a so-called “host country” and create the conditions necessary for achieving our war aims. All of our recent experiments with COIN overseas have failed.
Even though we escalated the Vietnam War in the 1960s until we had over a half million men in country, we were unable to achieve victory. As the American public grew exhausted and demanded an end to the politically divisive war, we once again put our hopes in the development of the South Vietnamese Government and its Army of the Republic of Vietnam (SFA), only to see the house of cards collapse during the North’s 1975 military offensive. The war cost the U.S. military over 55,000 dead and the American treasury almost three-quarters of a trillion dollars, measured in 2011 dollars.
Our recently ended war in Iraq spawned the “new” COIN doctrine, FM 3-24, which was published in December 2006 near the height of the Shiite-Sunni civil war in Iraq. Though American forces had been “in the lead” in counterinsurgent efforts since our 2003 invasion, the violence in Iraq was escalating in 2006 to the point that catastrophe seemed imminent. In 2007 and 2008, the U.S. “surge” of additional combat brigades into Iraq overwhelmed the insurgency and nearly destroyed it, but at a high political price. Our war aims at the time of the invasion were to emplace a government in Baghdad consonant with our interests and establish long-term bases to support an American force presence of around 25,000 troops, similar to our residual forces in South Korea. But in 2008 the al-Malaki government in Iraq insisted that the Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the United States require all U.S. forces to leave his country by the end of 2011, an agreement that President Bush signed and President Obama honored. Despite the American effort, Iraq remains a fractious, unstable area. To our disappointment, the al-Malaki government has moved ever closer to Teheran diplomatically, even siding with Iran in supporting the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, whom the U.S. earnestly seeks to remove from power. Hardly the strategic victory we desired, Operation Iraqi Freedom nevertheless cost the United States nearly 4,500 lives and over three-quarters of a trillion dollars.
Neither is it evident that our war in Afghanistan will end in strategic success. As the war drags on in its eleventh year, the American and coalition support for the effort dwindles and nation after nation announces the termination or downsizing of its commitments over the upcoming year or two. Despite years of the United States and other coalition partners leading the counterinsurgency effort, the Taliban is still characterized as “resilient” and progress “fragile and reversible.” Making matters worse, Afghanistan’s principle neighbors—Iran and Pakistan—still have no interest in seeing the American experiment in their strategic back yard succeed, and Pakistan even allows its territory to be used as a sanctuary and training ground for Taliban insurgents. Our hope is that Afghanistan’s coalition-created national army and police forces will be able to “take the lead” in providing security throughout the country prior to the end of 2014, when coalition combat forces are scheduled to leave. Only the most Pollyannaish still envision Afghanistan emerging from Operation Enduring Freedom as a stable and modernizing nation state governed effectively from Kabul. Hedging their bet on the new Afghanistan, well-to-do Afghanis are sending their hard currency spoils of war overseas for safety in record amounts, a capital flight that possibly portends the elite diaspora to come. Much of the money now exiting Afghanistan is part of the $641 billion dollars the U.S. has spent or will spend on the war from Fiscal Year 2002 through Fiscal Year 2013. Over 1800 Americans have died in the war so far.
The Vital Role of Legitimacy
Why are the strategic outcomes of our American-led COIN efforts abroad so disappointing? Simply put, our “Americans in the lead” COIN operations undermine the legitimacy of the government we are attempting to support. As FM 3-24 itself observes, “Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate….Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule.” Judging by the historical record, legitimate host country governments rarely--if ever--invite in the army of another nation to take the lead in quelling their domestic insurgencies. Allowing foreigners to kill citizens would only inspire further rebellion and indicate a loss of governmental sovereignty and legitimacy. (American Patriot’s became righteously inflamed by England’s use of Hessian mercenaries in our Revolutionary War.)
In all of our failed COIN efforts in Asia—Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—we created the governments in question and then sought to defend those regimes from their countrymen who opposed them. Our very presence in these nations provoked what FM 3-24 describes as “resistance movements, where indigenous elements seek to expel or overthrow what they perceive to be a foreign or occupation government.” Given the decisive nature of governmental legitimacy, our FM 3-34 COIN approach, while perhaps tactically and operationally gratifying in the short term, is ultimately counterproductive. Simply, the foreign counterinsurgent force cannot transfer his hard won, Hobbesian monopoly of violence to a domestic political entity without fatally undermining that entity’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
As it inevitably turns out, the “host country” government’s quest for legitimacy causes its leadership to distance itself from American support and our war aims as a technique for developing its base of domestic popular support. Again from authors of FM 3-24, “Military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents. However, success in the form of a durable peace requires restoring legitimacy… A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting success without the [host nation] government achieving legitimacy.” Counterinsurgent “host nation” governments cannot achieve the victory they desire as long as they are seen kowtowing to foreign occupiers. Our strained relations with the leaders of our “host nations”—Diem (later Thieu), al-Malaki, and Karzai—all reflect the crippling contradictions inherent in their situation: the U.S. military presence both underwrites and undermines their governmental legitimacy and their national sovereignty by our very actions. To achieve their war aims, they must eventually, insofar as possible, reject ours. Diem became so uncontrollable that we averted our eyes while his military assassinated him. Al-Malaki negotiated the American exodus from Iraq and shifted his base of international support to Iran. One can only speculate how the mercurial Karzai will navigate his crisis of legitimacy in the final act of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Has the COIN Strategy Described in FM 3-24 Ever Succeeded in a Foreign Land?
Curiously, there is little evidence that the FM 3-24 approach to COIN has ever achieved overseas victory, at least in the post-colonial era. What has been achieved at the tactical and operational levels of war has not translated into lasting strategic success. Much of the modern counterinsurgency doctrine traces back to the work of two French officers, David Galula and Roger Trinquier, who based their writings on France’s wars in Vietnam and Algeria, both of which were strategic debacles for the French Republic. Robert Thompson, the British general who led the COIN campaign in Britain’s Malaysia colony in the 1950s and later advised the Americans in Vietnam, is often cited as another favorite of the FM 3-24 authors. Though over a period of years Thompson defeated the largely ethnic-Chinese and Communist insurgency, Britain nevertheless failed to keep Malaysia as a colony or even a protectorate, the Malays in 1957 achieving complete independence from England. Similarly, the British defeated the Mau-Mau uprising (1952-56) only to cede their Kenyan colony to their former enemy, Jomo Kenyatta, in 1963. Outright defeats and ephemeral victories are the historical legacy of the FM 3-24 “foreigners in the lead” approach.
Using more heavy handed methods not recommended in FM 3-24, the Soviets in 1979 invaded Afghanistan to save the Communist government the Kremlin had helped empower in a coup the prior year. Though the influx of Russian units temporarily stemmed the mujahedeen insurgent offensive, the Red Army’s presence inspired a far larger insurgency and a lengthy, bloody, and costly war. The Soviets eventually retreated from Afghanistan after ten years of exhaustive combat and the Communist government in Kabul fell, in time, to the Taliban.
In all of these recent cases, some cited as models in FM 3-24 or its predecessor documents, major world powers were unable to secure strategic victories as the principal COIN actors against local insurgents in a foreign country. All these wars were, ultimately, defeats.
In contrast, both the British and the Russians have recently proven themselves capable of defeating insurgencies and maintaining their sovereignty in their own countries—the British in Northern Ireland and the Russians in Chechnya. COIN efforts aimed at maintaining domestic sovereignty are simply more likely to succeed than those attempting to extend sovereignty overseas or defend a foreign “host” government’s legitimacy.
Give SFA a Chance: Rethinking our Strategic Approaches in Iraq and Afghanistan
Our most recent COIN wars—in Iraq and Afghanistan-- were a reaction to our invasions of those two countries and the deposing of the previous governments. The insurgencies grew to fill the post-invasion deficiencies in governance and security and to contest the American presence.
Clearly, the U.S. military should have better thought through and resourced our occupation policies in both countries. As the Department of Defense now recognizes, the U.S. Army needs to create a military governance capability to stabilize foreign societies that we occupy as a result of our offensive military operations. Deploying trained military government units as part of our invasion force prevented civil anarchy during World War II, and the approach could work again. Civil security is, of course, an indispensible component of governance and stability, especially in preventing and defeating insurgencies. The urgent post-invasion requirement is for the Army to co-opt local security forces and place them under Army supervision so that social order is maintained. Rather than make our forces the cops on the beat and the primary counterinsurgents, we would be better served by enlisting local allies and existing security structures for these purposes if at all possible, using a SFA approach to bolster and coordinate their capabilities.
We missed our opportunities for using SFA in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and paid an enormous price for our miscalculations. In Iraq, we initially failed to employ, then quickly disbanded organized Iraqi army divisions that were willing and able to maintain civil order in collaboration with the American occupation force. Prior to the invasion, American officials had contacted Iraqi division commanders, requesting they sit out the war and promising their incorporation in the post-Saddam Iraq. Perhaps some of compliant units, provided with American advisors, could have helped maintain order in Baghdad and elsewhere, minimizing the looting and chaos that accompanied the “liberation.” Making matters worse, in his first days in Baghdad, Coalition Provisional Authority Jerry Bremer III reversed the Army’s Phase IV planning assumptions and disbanded the Iraqi military. As Jay Garner, who had led the short-lived Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, later related, “So on Saturday morning when we woke up, we had somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000 enemies we didn’t have on Wednesday morning, and we had no Iraqi face of leadership to explain things to the Iraqi people. We began to pay significantly for those decisions.” The dismissals provided immediate recruits, many with military training, to the already growing insurgency. As a consequence, U.S. military personnel, without the necessary language, cultural, or local knowledge, become the primary counterinsurgents in Iraq, fighting a war against an enemy they could hardly identify in a land they didn’t understand. The downward spiral of violence that engulfed Iraq into 2008 is a matter of historical record. We can only speculate whether a SFA approach based on employing and strengthening the Iraqi army would have better served our strategic war aims at far less cost. But we had an alternative that many key actors at the time believed we failed to exploit.
In Afghanistan, too, we elected to ignore the existing security structures, such as they were, in an attempt to create a new national army and police force from scratch. As the battle of Tora Bora raged in December 2001 and CENTCOM became refocused on Iraq, the United States shucked off its responsibilities for post-war security and SFA on the UN-created International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a mostly European patchwork coalition of the willing, so under-resourced that it could barely secure Kabul at first, and only after years grew its presence throughout the remainder of Afghanistan. Overreaching its grasp, the UN and ISAF envisioned a wholesale transformation of the country into a modern, functioning nation state administered from Kabul, a practical impossibility, given the regions culture and development. Meanwhile, the Taliban regrouped and gained ground as our hopes for an effective Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police force was slow to bear fruit. In 2008 we began the Americanization of the counterinsurgency effort, with American forces gradually assuming the lead in the most active insurgent areas, as the Army “surged” from Iraq into Afghanistan. By 2012 the 130,000 ISAF forces in Afghanistan battling the Taliban included some 90,000 American personnel.
There never was or will be an ideal or assured solution in Afghanistan. Nor can we ever prove the counterfactual. But we did in 2001 have the option of attempting to secure our interests in Afghanistan with a modest, small-footprint SFA mission aimed at bolstering the capabilities of the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban partners, some of them branded as “warlords,” that existed in the country at the time. Some suggested that arming the traditional village militias [arkabi] would likely suffice to secure rural populations in many instances." Many voices in the Special Forces community argued against a “large footprint” conventional force presence in Afghanistan, preferring small-scale SFA instead. However, U.S. support for a centralized government in Kabul and a new national army and police force precluded a small SFA mission based on and expanding from the base of preexisting security forces. Perhaps a tribal and local approach could have worked, at least in many areas of the country. It definitely would have been far cheaper in both American lives and dollars. And in all likelihood, the strategy would have been sufficient to guarantee our only core interest in Afghanistan—sufficient access to see that al Qaida would never be able again to use that nation as a platform for attacking the U.S. homeland.
SFA Practice and Doctrine
The primary rule in SFA is that the host nation counterinsurgent government, through its own security forces, must do all the killing. Only then can it gain its monopoly of violence, establish its legitimacy, and begin the decades- long trek toward national reconciliation and, eventually perhaps, some sort of democracy. Understanding this imperative, U.S. military advisory groups in the pre-Vietnam period, often restricted by executive order, maintained small footprints, strengthening and transforming the host nation security forces outward from their institutional centers. U.S. advisors rarely if ever accompanied tactical units in the field and, when they did so, were often prohibited from carrying arms, even pistols for personal protection. To the people in the contested areas, the visible counterinsurgent was always his countryman. Until Vietnam, the post-World War II Army never seriously considered becoming the principal COIN force in an overseas country or “partnering” with host-nation forces in combined COIN operations.
Unfortunately, COIN discussion is missing from the Army’s new SFA doctrinal manual, FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, published in January 2013. To be fair, FM 3-22 is written to address a wide gamut of security cooperation possibilities, not getting specific about any particular scenario. Still, FM 3-22 allows U.S. SFA units to conduct combat operations and advise host nation security forces down to the lowest tactical levels. Moreover, while there is no text in FM 3-22 describing the organization of a military advisory group in a COIN scenario, the manual devotes an entire chapter to the subject of rotating regionally aligned brigades—tactical units-- in and out of theater and their “partnering” with host nation forces. In some forms of warfare, perhaps, the second- and third-order effects of these SFA practices allowed by FM 3-22 may not prove deleterious. But in COIN the introduction of foreign combatants into the tactical fight will predictably lead to unwanted escalation as sovereignty issues, specifically nationalism and governmental legitimacy are made ever more volatile.
My thesis is that the “Americans in the lead” FM 3-24 COIN doctrine is a path to strategic disappointment. However brilliant the manual may be at describing operational and tactical detail, at the end of the day the approach leads to inadequate strategic results at exorbitant costs. Based on the evidence, the U.S. military would better serve the Nation’s strategic aims overseas by resisting the impulse to Americanize our current and upcoming COIN efforts. Small-footprint SFA is almost always, perhaps even invariably, the better approach to defeating insurgents overseas. Indeed, we would be better served doing all in our power to avoid situations where we could or would become the principal counterinsurgents in somebody else’s country. SFA should probably be our first--and last--response to defeating foreign insurgencies.
The rewritten FM 3-24 COIN doctrine appropriately should describe how a national government and its security forces can defeat an insurgency. But, based on the clear pattern of strategic results, the new FM 3-24 should clearly state that SFA is America’s only sanctioned approach to defeating insurgencies overseas and direct that combatant commanders must take all measures necessary to ensure that U.S. combat forces will not be put in the position of conducting the operations described in FM 3-24 with “Americans in the lead.” Overseas, we should teach and support COIN, not do it ourselves. And, if SFA should fail, we should probably infer that the government under attack is not worthy of the American commitment required to save it. Most likely, cutting our losses better serves our strategic interest at that point.
 Birtle Andrew J, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976, Center of Military History, 2006, pp 42-55, 55-66, 85-98.
 Diaz-Mateus, Juvenal, “Democratic Security and Defense Policy: A Successful Counterinsurgency Model,” CGSC MMAS, 2012.
 JUSMAPG-Greece was staffed by about 100 officers and men and total aid to Greece through 1950 was $2 billion. The Korea MAG had less than 500 officers and men in 1949 and its FY1950 budget for military assistance was $11 million. JUSMAG-Philippines had 60 officers and men and provided $117 million in military aid over six years. Soto Cano Airbase, established in 1981, is home to some 5000 U.S. service personnel and contractors, a portion of whom conduct SFA in a variety of manners. The U.S. advisory group to El Salvador had 55 trainers and advisors. US military aid to Columbia has been several hundred million dollars a year for over a decade and dozens of trainers and contractors are in country, though no MAG (military advisory group) has been constituted. Data from various sources, including: Selected Aspects of U.S. Military Assistance, Historical Division, JCS, 13 Dec 1961; Congressional Research Service Report RL30172; and Birtle, ibid.
 Birtle Andrew J, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976, Center of Military History, 2006, p 31-42.
 MAC-V began with 685 advisors in 1954, growing slowly until President Kennedy decided, among other things, to put U.S. advisors with each ARVN battalion and provide aviation and air support as well. By 1963, the U.S. had 23,000 military personnel in Vietnam, two-thirds from the Army. Birtle, pp 622-6.
 Daggett, Stephen, “Costs of Major U.S. Wars,” Congressional Research Service, June 29, 2010, p 2.
 Hanley, Charles J., “Elaborate U.S. bases raise long-term questions,” Associated Press, March 23, 2006, and Packer, George, The Assassins' Gate, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005, p 133.
 Schmidt, Michael S. and Ghazi, Yasir, “Iraqi Leader Backs Syria, With a Nudge From Iran,” New York Times, August 12, 2011.
 Daggett, Stephen, “Costs of Major U.S. Wars,” Congressional Research Service, June 29, 2010, p 2.
 Quinn, Patrick, “French President Says Afghan Mission Completed,” Associated Press, May 25, 2012.
 Green, Matthew, “Afghanistan acts to curb flight of capital,” Financial Times, March 18, 2012.
 Cordesman Anthony H., “The U.S. Cost Of The Afghan War: Fy2002-Fy2013: Cost in Military Operating Expenditures and Aid and Prospects for “Transition”,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 14, 2012.
 FM 3-24, 15 Dec 06, p 1-1.
 As Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence: “He [King George]is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.”
 FM 3-24, 15 Dec 06, p 1-1.
 FM 3-24, 15 Dec 06, p 1-22.
 Department of Defense Directive Number 5100.01, December 21, 2010, p 30.
 Melton, Stephen, The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward), Zenith Press, 2009, p 52-68, 159-176.
 Packer, George, The Assassins' Gate, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005, p 190.
 Garner, Jay, cited in Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign, Brian De Toy, general editor, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004, p 265-6.
 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone, Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, p 74-77.
 General Dan K. McNeill, address to Land forces Symposium in Islamabad, Pakistan, 13 April, 2007, reprinted by Strategic Studies Institute, p 3-4.
 Yochi J. Dreazen, "Britain Sees Role for Afghan Tribes," Wall Street Journal, January 10, 2008, p 4.
 FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, January 2013, p 4-3, 4-8, 4-9.
 FM 3-22, Chapter 5.